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Administered Prices and the
Concentration of Economic Power
The celebrated clash between the President of the United
States and the steel industry in last year's steel crisis sharp-
ly brought to public attention problems of administered
prices and the concentration of economic power. In this
Article based on the hearings of the Kefauver Subcom-
mittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Professor Auerbach
deals with the economic and noneconomic consequences
of economic concentration in answering the question
whether we should be concerned about the concentration
of economic power. He discusses various solutions, includ-
ing the breakup of concentrations and their regulation by
government. Professor Auerbach concludes that some
form of statutory price and wage regulation is needed to
attain high employment, steadily increasing output, and
stable prices.
Carl A. Auerbach*
For the past five years, the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of Senator Estes
Kefauver of Tennessee, has been conducting a broad investigation
of "administered prices" in American industry. It has studied the
steel,' automobile, ' electrical manufacturing,' drug," asphalt
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See Hearings on Administered Prices Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 2-4 (1957) (all hearings of the Kefauver Subcom-
mittee, 1957-1961, are hereinafter cited as Hearings); Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Administered
Prices in the Steel Industry, S. REP. No. 1387, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958)(hereinafter cited as Steel Industry Report). Another investigation of the
steel industry is currently in progress.
2. 1958 Hearings, pts. 6, 7; SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOP-
OLY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th CONG. 2D S.SS.,
STUDY OF ADMINISTERED PRICES IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (Comm.
Print 1958) (hereinafter cited as Automobile Industry Report).
3. 1959 Hearings, pt. 13 (dealing generally with identical bidding on
sales to the TVA); 1961 Hearings, pts. 27, 28 (dealing with price fixing
and bid rigging in the electrical manufacturing industry).
4. 1959 Hearings, pts. 14, 15; 1960 Hearings, pts. 16-26; Antitrust and
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roofing,' and bread' industries. In addition, the Kefauver Sub-
committee has sought the views of leading economists and rep-
resentatives of labor and management on the nature of the problem
of "administered prices" and the alternative policies that have
been suggested to deal with it.' It has also issued two reports on
the extent of concentration in American industry, based upon data
compiled from the Census of Manufactures for 1954 and 1958
by the Commerce Department's Bureau of the Census.' In all,
it has published more than 18,000 pages of hearings and reports.
The Kefauver Subcommittee has been entrusted by Congress to make
a complete, comprehensive and continuing study and investigation of
unlawful restraints and monopolies, and of the antitrust and antimonop-
oly laws of the Uuited States, their administration, interpretation, oper-
ation, enforcement, and effect, and to determine and from time to
time redetermine the nature and extent of any legislation which may
be necessary or desirable . . . for the attainment of the fundamental
objects [of the antitrust laws]. 9
At the outset of the hearings, Senator Kefauver emphasized that
his Subcommittee was seeking to determine how the antitrust
Monopoly Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, Administered
Prices in the Drug Industry, S.REP. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
5. 1958 Hearings, pt. 5; SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOP-
OLY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
ADMINISTERED PRICES IN THE ASPHALT ROOFING INDUSTRY (Comm.
Print 1958).
6. 1959 Hearings, pt. 12; Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Study of Administered Prices in the
Bread Industry, S. REP. No. 1923, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
7. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1; 1959 Hearings, pts. 9-11.
8. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON CONCENTRATION
IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1957) (hereinafter cited as REPORT
ON CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY); SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTI-
TRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PT. 1, REPORT ON CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MAUFAC-
TURING INDUSTRY (Comm. Print 1962) (hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MAUFACTURING INDUSTRY).
9. S. RES. No. 258, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 108 CONG. REC. 345 (daily
ed. Jan. 18, 1962). Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate specifies
the jurisdiction of each standing committee of the Senate. Among the
subjects allotted to the Committee on the Judiciary is the "protection of
trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753 § 102, 60 Stat. 818 (1946).
Until 1955, the Judiciary Committee entrusted this subject matter to
a Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly Legislation. This Subcommittee
operated without special funds, which must be provided by special resolu-
tion of the Senate. The present Subcommittee was first created in 1955
when special funds for investigation were thus provided. S. Res. 61,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The 1962 Senate resolution appropriated
$450,000 for the work of the Subcommittee during 1962.
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laws could be made to work so as "to guarantee to the American
people the benefits of competitive pricing" and termed price regu-
lation "a last resort."" Nevertheless, the only piece of pricing
legislation seriously considered by the Subcommittee was S. 215-
an effort at informal price regulation." No report on S. 215 was
rendered by the Subcommittee, and no recommendations have yet
been made by it for any change in the antitrust laws.
The accomplishments of the Kefauver Subcommittee cannot be
judged solely by the legislation that it has produced. Its work
must be judged fruitful if it has brought to public attention im-
portant issues of public policy which must still be resolved. What-
ever doubt may have existed on this score before the celebrated
encounter between the President of the United States and the steel
industry in the spring of 1962 must surely have been dispelled
by the President's action thwarting the threatened increase in the
price of steel. This Article will discuss the issues that concern the
Kefauver Subcommittee and the contribution it is making to their
resolution.'2
I. SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER?
A. SOME ESTIMATES OF THE EXTENT OF CONCENTRATION
"The No. 1 weakness of the antitrust laws today," concluded
the majority of the Kefauver Subcommittee, "is their inadequacy
as a means of coping with. . . the problem of the concentration
of economic power."" That economic power is concentrated is
not subject to dispute. The largest 200 manufacturing companies
in 1958 accounted for 38 percent of the total dollar value
(141 billion dollars) added by the manufacturing activity of all
companies in the United States, compared with 30 percent in
1947.14 Their share thus increased by almost 27 percent from
1947 to 1958.
10. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 3, 196; pt. 2, at 325.
11. S. 215, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For the text of S. 215, see
1959 Hearings, pt. 11, at 5183-85. The most important piece of legislation,
not directly dealing with prices, for which the Kefauver Subcommittee
is responsible is the Drug Industry Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). The
drug thalidomide must be credited with an assist.
12. This paper is one of several prepared by members of a study group
that the writer formed, at the request of Mr. W. H. Ferry of the Fund
for the Republic's Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, to
evaluate the work of the Kefauver Subcommittee. The only other paper
in the series that has been published to date is Stigler, Administered Prices
and Oligopolistic Inflation, 35 J. Bus. 1 (1962).
13. Steel Industry Report 2.
14. REPORT ON CONCENTRATION RATIos IN MANUFACTURING IN-
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On the whole, the companies that were the largest in 1947 re-
mained among the largest in 1958. The companies that were the
100 largest in 1958 accounted for 30 percent of the total dollar
value added by manufacture in 1958; these same companies ac-
counted for 22 percent of the value added in 1947.15 By con-
trast, the share of the largest 100 companies in 1947 was 23 per-
cent.'6 Of the 50 largest companies in 1947, 34 were still among
the 50 largest in 1958. Twelve of the 50 largest in 1947 were
among the 100 largest in 1958 and four of the 50 largest in 1947
were among the 200 largest in 1958.11
The change in the degree of concentration over the period
1947-58 varied from industry to industry. For example, among
those industries in which the total value of shipments exceeded
one billion dollars in 1958, the four largest companies in the
following industries accounted for a greater percentage of the total
dollar value of shipments in 1958 than in 1947-steel (53 per-
cent in 1958 and 50 percent in 1947); automobiles (75 percent
and 56 percent respectively); farm machinery, except tractors (38
percent and 36 percent respectively); tractors (69 percent and 67
percent respectively); gray-iron foundries (24 percent and 16 per-
cent respectively); cement (32 percent and 30 percent respec-
tively); radios and related products (27 percent and 26 percent
respectively); bread and related products (22 percent and 16 per-
cent respectively); flour and meal (38 percent and 29 percent
respectively); soap and glycerine (90 percent and 79 percent re-
spectively); beer and ale (28 percent and 21 percent respectively);
canned fruits and vegetables (29 percent and 27 percent respec-
tively); and synthetic broad-woven fibers (34 percent and 31
percent respectively).
In the following industries in which the total value of shipments
exceeded one billion dollars in 1958, the largest four companies
DUSTRY 8. "Value added by manufacture is derived by subtracting from
the value of shipments of any manufacturing plant or establishment the
cost of materials, supplies, containers, fuel purchased, electric enerey,
and contract work." REPORT ON CONCENTRATION IN AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRY 7. In 1958, the Census Bureau made certain adjustments in the
measurement of value added by manufacture that it believed "had little
effect on the ranking and relative shares of individual companies or on
the aggregate shares of the 50, 100, 150 or 200 largest companies in each
year." REPORT ON CONCENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING IN-
DUSTRY 7.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Ibid. Similar data for the largest 200 companies in 1958 and
1947, respectively, are not presented.
17. Id. at 9. Similar data for the 200 companies that were the largest
in 1947 are not presented.
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accounted for a lesser percentage of the total dollar volume of
shipments in 1958 than in 1947-meat packing (34 percent in
1958 and 41 percent in 1947); cigarettes (79 percent and 90
percent respectively); petroleum refining (32 percent and 37 per-
cent respectively); tires and inner tubes (74 percent and 77 per-
cent respectively); aluminum rolling and drawing (78 percent and
94 percent respectively); copper rolling and drawing (48 percent
and 60 percent respectively); aircraft engines (56 percent and 72
percent respectively); non-rubber footwear (27 percent and 28
percent respectively); pharmaceutical preparations (27 percent
and 28 percent respectively); paints and varnishes (25 percent
and 27 percent respectively); wire drawing (34 percent and 45
percent respectively); motors and generators (47 percent and 59
percent respectively); and plastics (40 percent and 44 percent
respectively).
The largest four companies accounted for the same percentage
of the total dollar volume of shipments in 1958 and 1947 in the
following industries in which the total value of shipments exceeded
one billion dollars in 1958-refrigeration machinery (39 percent)
and synthetic fibers (78 percent).
The 1958 share of the largest four companies in the industries
listed above varied from 22 percent of the total dollar value of
shipments (bread and related products) to 90 percent thereof
(soap and glycerine).8
B. THE ECONOIC CONSEQUENCES OF CONCENTRATION
In essence, it is the thesis of the majority of the Kefauver Sub-
committee that the concentration of economic power is the basis
of an ancillary power to "administer" prices that can be and has
been exercised in ways that produce socially undesirable results.
1. Means' Definition of "Administered" Prices
A good deal of the confusion that the controversy over ad-
18. Id. at 43-47. In his letter transmitting the 1958 report on con-
centration, Senator Kefauver discusses the ways in which the reported
concentration ratios may either understate or overstate the extent of con-
centration. Id. at iv-vi. He cites the conclusion of Professor Joe S. Bain
that "there is . . . some [significant but moderate] net average tendency
for census-industry concentration measures to understate the degree of
seller concentration within the numerous theoretical industries into which
existing enterprises should be grouped." Id. at vi. The quotation is from
BArN, INDUSTRAL ORGANIZATION 119 (1959). The minority members of
the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee-Senators Wiley, Dirksen, and
Hruska-dissassociated themselves from this conclusion. Id. at x. See
also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCEN-
TRATION RATios (1957); U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE STATISn-
CAL BASIS OF CONCENTRATION RATIOS (1957).
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ministered prices has engendered may be attributed to the loose
way in which Gardiner C. Means-regarded by all as the father
of the theory of administered prices-originally stated his doctrine.
An "administered" price, said Means, is "a price set by someone,
usually a producer or seller, and kept constant for a period of
time and for a series of transactions," as distinguished from a
"market" price, which "fluctuates on the basis of supply and de-
mand as these forces are felt in the market."'0 According to these
definitions, as Means recognized, "market" prices are to be found
only for agricultural commodities and some raw materials; most
industrial prices, a large portion of retail prices (including prices
in restaurants and barbershops), and most wage rates, are "ad-
ministered."2 Thus, in his initial testimony, Means did not iden-
tify "administered" prices with those charged in concentrated in-
dustries. Nor did he hold "administered" prices responsible for
inflation; on the contrary, he recognized that at times they lagged
behind "market" prices and served to inhibit inflationary move-
ments."' "Administered" prices, Means insisted, are not undesir-
able per se; they are here to stay and lead to greater efficiency
and higher standards of living.22
After this exposition, it is difficult to see why "administered"
prices should have concerned the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly. But Means was quick to warn that firms in
the "administered" price area had discretion to fix prices at a
number of different levels, each of which would yield the same
total profits, and that this discretion could be exercised in ways
harmful to the public interest. 3 He asked the Subcommittee to
undertake an ambitious program of research to ascertain how, in
fact, this discretion was used.24
In subsequent testimony, however, Means explained that "ad-
ministered" prices in concentrated industries should be of special
concern to the Subcommittee because the greater the concentration.
the less the restraint upon pricing discretion imposed by market
forces and the greater the possibility of the abuse of discretion.
To make his point, Means attributed the price inflation from 1953
to 1958 to increases in "administered" prices in concentrated in-
dustries.2"
19. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 75.
20. Ibid. Even the prices of agricultural commodities are "administered"
under the various price support programs.
21. Id. at 93.
22. Id. at 75.
23. Id. at 84, 88.
24. ld. at 88, 98-100.
25. 1959 Hearings, pt. 9, at 4800-01.
26. Id., pt. 9, at 4748, pt. !0, at 4897-923.
[Vol. 47:139
ADMINISTERED PRICES
2. "Administered" Prices, Price "Rigidity" and the Restriction
of Output
(a) Are "Administered" Prices "Rigid" Prices? Are There
"Rigid" Prices?
To prove his thesis, Means presented a chart showing the
changes, from 1953 to October, 1958, in the wholesale prices of
three different groups of commodities which together make up
the Wholesale Price Index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.'
One group, which Means maintained was "dominated by price
administration," consisted of the following classes of products:
metal and metal products, machinery and motive products, rubber
and rubber products, non-metallic minerals, pulp and paper prod-
ucts, tobacco, and bottled beverages. The second group, which
Means maintained was "market dominated," consisted of the fol-
lowing classes of products: farm products, processed foods, textile
products and apparel, hides, skin and leather products, and lumber
and wood products. The third group, described by Means as
"mixed," consisted of the following classes of products: fuel, power
and lighting materials, chemicals and allied products, and furniture
and other household durables. Means then showed that in 1958
"'the administration-dominated groups of prices were well above
their 1953 levels while the market-dominated groups were at or
below their 1953 levels."
Professor George J. Stigler seeks to refute Means' theory of
"administered" prices on the ground that the BLS Wholesale Price
Index cannot be relied upon to distinguish between "market" or
"flexible" and "administered" or "rigid" prices because (1) the
BLS does not report "at all accurately the actual behavior of the
prices at which important transactions take place"" and (2) well
-over 500 of the 1900 prices presently in the Index are obtained
from reports of one or two sellers, but if the number of price re-
porters were increased, the frequency of reported price changes
would also increase." Professor Stigler concludes that price "ri-
gidity," defined in terms of the frequency of changes in wholesale
prices reported by the BLS, is "a gross statistical illusion."'"
27. Id., pt. 10, at 4899.
28. Id. at 4898, 4909.
29. Stigler, supra note 12, at 5.
30. Id.. at- 4, 5. For his conclusions, Stigler relies upon McAlistcer's
Staff Paper No. 8 and Flueck's Staff Paper No. 9 printed in Hearings
on Government Price Statistics Before a Subcommittee on Economic Sta-
tistics of the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 87th Cong., Ist Sess.
pt. 1,.373, 419 (1961).
31. Stigler, supra note 12, at 4.
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Stigler's second point is perplexing. Granted that the frequency
of reported price changes increases with the number of price re-
porters, may we not assume that this will be the case in the "non-
administered," as well as in the "administered," price area? If so,
may there not still be such a recurring, quantitative difference
in the relative frequencies of price changes in the two areas (no
matter how large the number of price reporters) as to justify de-
scribing the prices in the one as "flexible" and in the other as
"rigid"? Stigler's data32 do not permit us to answer this question.
The product groups he uses to make his point (non-food materials,
non-food consumer goods, and producer goods) are not the same
product groups Means uses as the basis of his definitions. Means'
thesis would be disproved if any of the product groups he lists
in the "administered" category would have to be moved into the
"mixed" or "market-established" category, relative to the product
groups now listed by Means in these latter categories, when the
number of price reporters is increased for all product groups.3
(In this connection, too, the relative amplitude, as well as fre-
quency, of price changes would also have to be taken into ac-
count.3 ) It is recognized that it may not be practical to increase
the number of price reporters for many commodities in Means'
"market-established" category because the BLS prices for these
commodities are based upon market quotations and not on reports
from individual companies. But the very fact that the sources of
price information for the "administered" and "non-administered"
areas differ in this way tends to support the distinction Means
is trying to make.
As to Stigler's first point, it is true that the BLS Wholesale
Price Index is based on quoted prices and does not reflect dis-
counts from the published prices that may be granted to consum-
mate particular transactions. In evaluating this point, a distinction
must be made between open and hidden discounts. A particular
transaction, for example, may involve a quality of steel for which
there is no quoted price; the price may have to be determined
by deducting from or adding to a quoted base price. But the
method of computing the discount or premium for this purpose
may be known to all in the trade and may itself be "rigid." The
32. Id. at 4 (Table 1).
33. Stigler does point out that Means "classifies .. . textiles and ap-
parel as market-dominated and rubber products as administered, although
both groups had on average nine price changes from December, 1953, to
December, 1956." id. at 3.
34. Stigler maintains that the BLS also greatly underestimates the ampli-
tude of price changes and cites the study by Flueck, supra note 30, to this
effect. Id. at 7.
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existence of such discounts or premiums would not destroy the
usefulness of the Wholesale Price Index in distinguishing between
"flexible" and "inflexible" prices. However, the prevalence of
secret, unstructured discounts to consummate particular transac-
tions would raise questions about the usefulness of the Index in
making the distinction in question.
Dr. John M. Blair, chief economist to the Kefauver Subcom-
mittee, tries to deal with this latter possibility. "For the purpose
of analyzing the relationship between concentration and price ri-
gidity," he argues, "the B.L.S. series are invalidated only if it is
assumed that during a downswing secret discounts become rela-
tively more important in products of high than in products of low
concentration."' Relying primarily on a study by Saul Nelson,"
Blair concludes that this assumption is erroneous.
Offhand, however, it would seem that secret discounts from
quoted prices should be more characteristic of industries of high,
rather than low, concentration. The very factors that cause the
decline of open price competition in oligopolistic industries would
lead one to expect more secret price competition-through hidden
discounts-in these industries than in industries in which open
price competition prevails. Dr. Blair, however, is persuaded that
Mr. Nelson's study showed otherwise.
In any case, the question remains whether the concepts of
relative price rigidity and relative price flexibility would be de-
stroyed if secret discounts from published prices were taken into
consideration.
(b) Do "Administered" Prices Restrict Output?
The fact of the matter is that the majority of the Kefauver Sub-
committee is not concerned about the frequency of price changes
but about "the responsiveness of a price to changes in the mar-
ket."3 It defines price rigidity and price flexibility in terms of
this responsiveness. Its Steel Industry Report states: "It is possible
for a price, though changing infrequently, to be responsive to
changes in the market and thus approximate the classical market
behavior. The critical question is whether, when demand falls off
price is maintained through a decrease in production."'  Thus,
only those prices are "administered" that are maintained or even
35. Blair, Means, Thorp and Neal on Price Inflexibility, 38 REv. EcoN.
STAT. 427,429 (1956).
36. Nelson, A Consideration of the Validity of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Price Indexes, in NATiONAL RsouacES COMM., STRucTuRE oF
= AMmucAN EcoNoMY, pt. I, app. 1 (1939).
37. Steel Industry Report 6.
38. Ibid.
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increased in the face of declining demand and excess productive
capacity. These prices are of concern to the Subcommittee because
they are thought to result in the further under-utilization of the
commodities thus priced and to inhibit the optimum use of re-
sources.
39
Means himself made this point in his original paper on "ad-
ministered" prices in 1935 when he distinguished between mar-
kets in which "economic adjustments are brought about primarily
by fluctuations in price" and those in which "economic adjust-
ments are brought about primarily by changes in volume of pro-
duction."40 Dr. Edwin G. Nourse agrees that the danger of "ad-
ministered" prices inheres in the fact that management can fix
them so as to yield predetermined levels of profit by allowing
"volume of operations to bear the brunt of adjustment to whatever
consumer demand exists at that price level."'" This possibility,
according to Dr. Nourse, exists only when prices "are formulated
in executive offices as matters of operating policy or economic
planning by officials of corporations or unions who, through their
control over blocks of capital resources or labor resources, have
considerable power to implement the price schedules they
adopt."42 Nourse thus states the theory of administered prices
and wages in a way that ties it to the concentration of economic
power because in an industry in which "there are a very large
number of units," the "attempt to implement a price by control
of supply would not be effective."43
Stigler admits that if the facts support this theory of administered
prices, then it is "of the highest importance."44 But, resting princi-
pally upon TNEC Monograph No. 27," he states flatly that
Means' "suggestion" that "rigid prices led to large decreases in
output and employment, whereas industries with flexible prices
underwent small (if any) reductions in output" is not supported
by the facts.46 Yet Blair, in a recent paper not yet published,
states with equal certainty: "In all of the controversy which has
39. See the statements of Senator Kefauver, in 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 1,
pt. 2, at 197.
40. Means, Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, S. Doc.
No. 13, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935).
41. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 10-11.
42. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 21.
44. Stigler, supra note 12, at 1.
45. THORP, CROWDER & ASSOCIATES, TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECON.
COMM. 76Tri CONG., 3D SESS., THE STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRY, MONOGRAPH
No. 27 (Sen. Comm. Print 1941) (hereinafter cited as TNEC MONOGRAPH
No. 27).
46. Stigler, supra note 12, at 1.
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revolved around the price rigidity issue, there is one point on
which the findings of the various disputants are in agreement.
This is the finding of an inverse relationship between price and
production declines during the 1929-1933 downswing." T In sup-
port, Blair cites both Means 8 and his opponents-Thorp and
Crowder49 and Neal.5" Blair regards Professor Jules Backman
as the sole dissenter from the view that an inverse relationship
characterizes the movements of price and output.5" And even
Backman concluded that "within very broad limits there is evi-
dent some tendency for inflexibly-priced products to be accom-
panied by greater decreases in production than those which were
more responsive to the impact of outside forces.
'5 2
Like Nourse, Blair links price rigidity and the restriction of
output with concentration in industry. Blair maintains that "the
adjustment to a decline in demand" in oligopolistic industries
"usually takes the form of a decrease in production rather than
in price."' This view is contrary to the conclusion of Thorp and
Crowder that:
Concentration in the control of production of the products does not
appear to be associated with any particular and unique price or quan-
tity behavior in either the cyclical downswing from 1929 to 1933 or in
the upswing from 1933 to 1937. Products with high concentration
ratios and products with low concentration ratios experienced strikingly
similar changes in price and quantity.54
To test the Thorp-Crowder thesis, Blair compared the price be-
havior of the same products during the 1890-1897 and 1929-1933
47. Blair, The Inverse Relationship Between Price and Production De-
clines 1 (to be published as part of a forthcoming article on monopoly
and growth).
48. Means, supra note 40, at 3.
49. TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 27, at 379, 388-89, 394-95.
50. NEAL, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRICE INFLEXIBILITY 114
(1942). Blair writes: "Using the Census information [based on actual trans-
action prices--CAA] as his basic source of data, he [Neal] examined the
1929-33 changes in price and production for 85 manufacturing industries
and concluded that a tendency toward inverse association is apparent, thus
confirming the findings of Thorp and Crowder for individual commodities
and of Means for selected industries." Blair, supra note 47, at 4.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Backman, Price Flexibility and Changes in Production, National
Industrial Conference Board Bull., Feb. 20, 1939, p. 45. Blair adds that
this inverse relationship "appears more clearly. from Backman's data in
a table prepared by H. Gregg Lewis and appearing in an article by Ernest
Doblin." Blair, supra note 47, at 8, citing Doblin, Some Aspects of Price
Flexibility, 22 REv. EcoN. STAT. 183, 188 (1940).
53. Blair, Administered Prices: A Phenomenon in Search of a Theory.
49 AM. EcoN. REv. 431, 436-37 (Supp. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
54. TNEC MONOGRAPH No. 27, at 411.
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depressions. He found that the prices of farm products, foods,
textiles, and lumber (which Blair describes as "atomistic," and
Means would say were "market-established," during both depres-
sions) were flexible during both these periods. However, price
rigidity manifested itself in the later depression, relative to the
earlier one, "following the concentration of the industry, in such
diverse fields as iron and steel, salmon, salt, biscuits and crackers,
molasses, matches, plate glass, window glass, and anthra-
cite . . . -55 Blair attacks the Thorp-Crowder explanation of
price rigidity in terms of the characteristics of the product and
the Neal explanation in terms of changes in direct costs."
(c) The Findings of the Kefauver Subcommittee
(1) The Steel Industry
The Subcommittee's general conclusions about administered
prices were based primarily upon its study of the steel and auto-
mobile industries. The Subcommittee found that in the post-World
War II period, the steel industry either maintained or raised its
prices while the demand for its products was declining and its
capacity was grossly under-utilized.5"
Stigler doubts how "real this phenomenon is" because "there
are no adequate transaction prices on steel products." 8 But
there is no good reason to expect that an industry will raise its
quoted prices in the face of declining demand and below-capacity
operations, only thereafter secretly to undercut the new prices. And,
even if it did so, is it not likely that the transaction prices will
be higher after the quoted prices were increased than before? Why
else were the quoted prices raised?
In any case, Stigler asserts that "no light was shed" by the Sub-
committee on why the steel industry "raised prices while operating
at relatively low outputs" and offers an explanation of his own.
"The presence of congressional investigations such as this is a
very strong reason for the steel industry to raise quoted prices
whenever a suitable occasion (cost increase) occurs: if it reduced
quoted prices in depression, it would have the usual congressional
55. Blair, Economic Concentration and Depression Price Rigidity, 45
AM. ECON. REV. 566, 582 (Supp. 1955). To buttress his conclusion, Blair
cites Stigler, 4 Theory of Delivered Price Systems, 39 AM. ECON. REV.
1143, 1152 (1949). Blair, supra at 575.
56. Blair, supra note 35, at 431-35. For a criticism of this paper, see
Backman, Economic Concentration and Price Inflexibility, 40 REV. ECON.
STAT. 399 (1958). See also Blair, Rejoinder, 40 REV. EcON. STAT. 405
(1958).
57. Steel Industry Report 81-84.
58. Stigler, supra note 12, at 11.
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hearings when they were restored in prosperity." 9 This explana-
tion is not very persuasive. The immediate question is not why
the industry failed to reduce its prices "in depression," but why
it increased them at such a time. Furthermore, the fact that the
Kefauver Subcommittee sat did not deter the industry from in-
creasing its prices in 1957 and 1958.0 Most significant, however,
is the fact that the steel industry has the power to increase its
prices "whenever a suitable occasion .. .occurs," even "in de-
pression."
In his recent book, Means adds that the demand for steel dropped
to such an extent during the first half of 1960 that opera-
tions had to be curtailed from approximately 95 percent to 50
percent of engineering capacity. Yet only a very mild softening
of the mill prices for steel accompanied this drastic decline in
output.61
The Subcommittee made strong efforts to shed light on this
industry behavior. Acting on Means' suggestion, it questioned
corporate executives about the price-making process in their com-
panies in order to ascertain "what members of their organization
are involved in the decision, what information the decision makers
have before them . . .and what factors they take into account
in making a decision."62 While the inquiry along these lines
was not penetrating, it was sufficient to confirm Nourse's view
that steel and automobile prices "are formulated in executive of-
fices as matters of operating policy or economic planning."'
Mr. Roger M. Blough, then president of the United States
Steel Corporation, explained that the top managers of his com-
pany decided upon the six dollar per ton increase on July 1, 1957,
after lengthy consideration of many factors, including (1) overall
cost trends in the company; (2) the long-run competitive situation;
(3) the future demand for steel and its bearing on capacity re-
quirements; (4) "depreciation deficits" and (5) President Eisen-
hower's call for price restraint." While Mr. Blough thought that
an increase of nine or ten dollars per ton would have been justified,
59. Id. at 11-12.
60. It is possible, of course, that the price increases would have been
even greater if no congressional committee were there to call the industry
to account. It is difficult to know how to weigh the impact of congres-
sional investigations upon the price decisions of industry.
61. MEANS, PRICING POWER AND Tm PUBLIC INTEREST 200 (1962).
62. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 100.
63. Id. at 9.
64. 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, at 296-98. By a "depreciation deficit," Mr.
Blough means the amount by which the original cost of a machine, re-
covered by depreciation charges, falls short of its replacement cost. Id.
at 298.
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the management collectively agreed to propose a six dollar increase
to the board of directors, which discussed and approved the recom-
mendation.6" No record of intra-company discussions about prices is
kept. "We talk things out until we agree," said Mr. Blough.60
Mr. George M. Humphrey, chairman of the board of the Na-
tional Steel Corporation, contended that an increase in the price
of steel would be justified because of "declining earnings" due to
a low operating rate.67 Mr. A. B. Homer, president of the Bethle-
hem Steel Corporation, stated that it is the policy of his company
to keep the price of steel stable over considerable periods of
time.6 Dissenting from the Subcommittee's majority report on the
steel industry, Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois similarly empha-
sized the planning function of steel pricing. He wrote:
The record of these hearings contains many references to the fact
that planning the steel facilities needed to support the future growth
of our economy must be done 5, 10 or 15 years ahead. If the industry
is correct in seeing a long-term upward trend in steel demand, it must
make long-range plans on this basis. It cannot be diverted from its
long-term purpose by the normal fluctuations of the short-term market.
It must keep its customers throughout the business cycle and it must
continuously strive to expand the future demand for steel. 69
So, Senator Dirksen concluded, the industry cannot charge "what-
the-traffic-will-bear" when the short-run demand presses on ca-
pacity, nor can it reduce prices simply because short-run demand
falls off.7"
However meritorious these contentions may be, they hardly dis-
prove the thesis that steel prices are "administered" in the sense
that the limits fixed by the market do not deprive the executives
of the steel companies of wide discretion to determine the level
of steel prices, and that they sometimes exercise this discretion
so as to maintain or even increase steel prices "in depression."
The Subcommittee also concluded that price increases could not
be effectuated in the face of declining demand and under-utili-
zation of capacity without the suppression of price competition
by means of the institution of price leadership. Dr. Blair has
suggested that industry-wide wage negotiations in oligopolistic
industries facilitate price leadership by giving each oligopolist
65. Id. at 304-05.
66. Id. at 305.
67. 1957 Hearings, pt. 3, at 822-23. See charts introduced by Blair
to show that as the production of various steel products declined from
1947-1957, their prices increased. Id. at 884-90.
68. 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, at 666.
69. Steel Industry Report 170.
70. Ibid.
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"knowledge of his rivals' probable reaction to a given wage in-
crease," thus enabling the price leader to set "a price high enough
to meet general approval from the other producers but not so
high as to needlessly invite undercutting."7' The power to ad-
minister prices thus belongs to the price leader.
The clash between the President and the steel industry in the
spring of 1962 dramatically confirmed these findings of the Kef-
auver, Subcommittee. On March 31, 1962, President Kennedy
publicly congratulated the steel industry and the steelworkers'
union for negotiating a two-year agreement, effective the following
July 1, 1962, which was to 'be "obviously noninflationary and
should provide a solid base for continued price stability."72 On
April 10, Mr. Leslie B. Worthington, president of the United
States Steel Corporation, announced that the corporation (which
was then operating at approximately two-thirds of estimated 1961
capacity) would increase its prices by six dollars a ton on the
average, effective that midnight." The following day, Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, Republic Steel Corporation, Jones and Laughlin
Steel Corporation, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, and
Wheeling Steel Corporation, (which, with United States Steel,
account for almost 60 percent of the steel industry's output) stated
that they would follow suit.74
That same day, April 11, President Kennedy denounced these
"simultaneous- and identical actions of United States Steel and
other leading steel corporations" as "a wholly unjustifiable and
irresponsible defiance of the public interest" on the part of "a tiny
handful -of steel executives whose pursuit of private power and
profit exceeds their sense of public responsibility."75 The Presi-
dent made it known that the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission would examine "the significance of this action
in a free competitive economy"; the Department of Defense and
other agencies would review "its impact on their policies of pro-
curement"; and Congress would inquire "what legislative safe-
guards may be needed to protect the public interest."76
71. Blair, supra note 53, at 439.
72. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 1. The settlement in ques-
tion called for no increases in the hourly wage, but provided improvements
in fringe benefits amounting to abofit ten cents an hour for the first year.
Wages for the second year were left open to future negotiation, Id., April
15, 1962, § 4, p. 1, cols. 1, 3. See id., April 1, 1962, § 1, p. 1, col. 1;
p. 55, col. 1.
73. Id., April 11, 1962, p. 28; id., April 15, 1962, p. 28, col. 2.
74. Id., April 12, 1962, p. 1, col. 3; id., April 15, 1962, § 4, p. 1, cols.
1,3.
75. Id., April 12, 1962, p. 20, col. 1 (transcript of President Kennedy's
news conference of April 11, 1962).
76. Ibid.
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Mr. Blough, now chairman of the board of United States Steel,
indicated that the corporation would remain firm in the face of
this presidential attack.77 The Justice Department instituted a
grand jury investigation of the steel price increases to determine
whether the Sherman Act had been violated, and FBI agents began
to search for evidence.7" The Federal Trade Commission, the
Kefauver Subcommittee, and the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, opened immediate investigations.7"
The Secretary of Defense declared that he had directed "that where
possible procurement of steel for defense production will be shifted
to those companies which have not increased prices."8 The De-
fense Department announced that it had bypassed the United
States Steel Corporation and ordered 11,000 tons (five to six
million dollars' worth) of high-grade steel from the Lukens Steel
Corporation, which had not raised its prices.8 ' The President and
his advisers sought, privately, to persuade the other steel companies
not to raise their prices. 2
On April 13, Mr. Joseph L. Block, chairman of the board of
Inland Steel Corporation, the eighth largest steel producer in the
United States, stated that his company would not follow the lead
of United States Steel. "We do not feel," he said, "that an advance
in steel prices at this time would be in the national interest." 3
Kaiser Steel Corporation aligned itself with Inland Steel, 4 and
the price leader lost its followers. Bethlehem Steel was the first
of the five companies that followed the leadership of United States
Steel to rescind its increase.8" Finally, Mr. Worthington announced
that United States Steel was rescinding its price increase "in the
light of the competitive developments today, and all other current
circumstances, including the removal of a serious obstacle to proper
relations between Government and business."8"
That the market did not determine the price of steel in the
spring of 1962 is hardly open to doubt. Mr. Blough would have
fixed it, but for the intervention of the President, who-with the
help of Inland Steel-thwarted the price leadership of United
States Steel. Even though the price of steel was not increased, the
77. See id., April 13, 1962, p. 18 (transcript of news conference held
on April 12, 1962, by Mr. Roger M. Blough).
78. Id., April 13, 1962, p. 1, col. 8.
79. Id., April 12, 1962, p. 1, col. 2; p. 21, col. 8.
80. Id., April 14, 1962, p. 10, cols. 2, 4.
81. Id., col. 3.
82. Id., col. 1.
83. Id., at 1, col. 8: p. 10, col. 1.
84. Id., at 10, col. 2.
85. Ibid.
86. Id., col. 6.
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steel operating rate since April of 1962 has fallen to less than
60 percent of estimated capacityY
(2) The Automobile Industry
The Kefauver Subcommittee highlighted the practice of "target-
return" pricing in the automobile industry. Prices of the products
of the General Motors Corporation, for example, are established,
Mr. Harlow Curtice [then GM president] explained, by a price
policy committee composed of himself, Mr. Frederic G. Donner,
executive vice president and chairman of the financial policy com-
mittee, Mr. L. C. Goad, executive vice president in charge of the
automotive and parts divisions, and Mr. George Russell, vice presi-
dent in charge of the financial staff.s The Subcommittee found
that in setting its prices, General Motors seeks to attain a target
goal of 20 percent rate of return on net worth after taxes at a
predetermined level of production or standard volume. The amount
of profit per car needed to yield the desired rate of return at the
standard volume is incorporated as a cost in arriving at the price
level. When actual production exceeds standard volume, as has
been true during most of the postwar period, the actual rate of
return exceeds the target-General Motors' actual rate of return
after taxes on net worth during the period 1948-1957 averaged
25 percent.s9 Mr. Curtice defined "standard volume!' as "the
estimated rate of operations which represents the normal or aver-
age and annual utilization of a capacity that must be large enough
to meet the cyclical and seasonal peaks which are characteristic
of the automobile industry." 90 This "standard volume" is cur-
rently estimated as the number of cars GM has the capacity to
produce in 180 (16 hour or two shift) working days of the year.'
Other studies confirm the conclusions of the Kefauver Sub-
87. The steel operating rate was 58.5 percent for the week ended Oc-
tober 13, 1962, compared with 71.9 percent for the same week in 1961.
Id., Oct. 14, 1962, § 3, p. 13, cols. 4-5.
The events of April, 1962, seem to have disproved Professor M. A.
Adelman's prediction in 1960 that "steel prices have ceased to be inde-
pendent of the general price level." Adelman, Steel, Administered Prices
and Inflation, 75 Q.J. ECON. 16, 34, 40 (1961). Had the President not
acted, steel prices generally would have moved upward in rather inde-
pendent fashion.
88. 1958 Hearings, pL 6, at 2515-16.
89. Automobile Industry Report 104-29. See also 1958 Hearings, pt.
6, at 2523-25.
90. 1958 Hearings, pt. 6, at 2519.
91. Id. at 2519-24; Automobile Industry Report 106. See also Hearings
Before Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly on the Antitrust
Laws, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 3584 (1955) (testimony of Mr. Al-
bert Bradley of GM).
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committee with regard to target-pricing in the auto industry and
find this practice prevalent in other oligopolistic industries.92 On
the basis of the data in the hearings on the automobile industry,
Blair attributes to target-pricing the fact that "between 1955 and
1956, total new car registrations fell 17 percent while price, de-
pending on the index used, rose 4-5 percent; similarly between
1957 and 1958 new car registrations fell by more than 20 percent
while price again rose about 4 percent."93 To show that this
phenomenon is general in oligopolistic industries, Blair also in-
troduced into the record of the hearings a study, based on a BLS
report, showing that during the recessions of 1948-1949 and
1953-1954, in each of which the Federal Reserve Board index of
industrial production dropped by about seven percent, the prices
of products classified as "flexible" declined while the prices of
products classified as "rigid" remained virtually unchanged in the
earlier, and actually rose in the later, recession.94
(d) Evaluation of the Findings
The majority of the Kefauver Subcommittee concluded that
price administration presents the dual danger that
[If] the price maker . . . establishes his price at too low a level, he
fails to maximize his profitmaking possibilities, which in turn may im-
pede the flow of needed resources into the industry . . . [but if] he
establishes his price at too high a level, the fall in demand might re-
duce his oporations below the level of maximum profitability, and in
the process bring about a curtailment of output, reduction of employ-
ment and loss of purchasing power. 5
Yet the facts found by the Subcommittee indicate that price ad-
ministrators in oligopolistic industries fix their prices at "too low"
levels precisely when demand exerts inflationary pressures and at
"too high" levels when demand is insufficient for full-capacity
operation. As Senator Dirksen explained, the executives in ad-
ministered-price industries seek a longer-run price stability that
will be immune from "the normal fluctuations of the short-term
market."96
92. See KAPLAN, DIRLAM & LANZILLOrTI, PRIcno IN BIO Busi-
NESS (1958); Lanzillotti, Pricing Objectives in Large Companies, 48 AM.
ECON. REV. 921 (1958). For a summary of the target returns of ten large
industrial corporations, see Blair, supra note 53, at 440.
93. Blair, supra note 53.
94. 1959 Hearings, pt. 10, at 4997-5013, based upon BLS Report
No.* 142, Frequency of Change in Wholesale Prices: A Study of Price
Flexibility (1958).
95. Steel Industry Report 53.
96. See notes 69 & 70 supra and accompanying text.
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Should the criterion of the public interest be whether oligo-
polistic industries maximize their profits? If so, may we not rely
upon the managers of these industries to know best what policies
will maximize their profits in the long run? In addition, may not
the failure of these industries to maximize their profits at every
opportunity be in the public interest? Means, for example, regards
the tendency of administered prices to lag behind market prices
during periods of excessive demand as a beneficial anti-inflationary
factor.9" And Professor Alvin H. Hansen thinks that, at least at
the beginning of a depression, price rigidity is probably a positive
good because price reductions would "accelerate the decline in
the national income and thus intensify the downward movement
in business activity" and confirm "the already unfavorable business
expectations engendered by the decline in investment" that pre-
cipitated the downward movement." (Hansen assumes that such
price reductions would be accompanied by reductions in money
wages.99) Professor Sumner H. Slichter has also contended that
increasing money wages ("administered" wages) in the 1958 re-
cession had a favorable effect on employment and output by
producing rising expenditures and incomes.'
The Hansen-Slichter views seem to conflict with Blair's position
that an inverse relationship exists between prices and output. In
evaluating the conflict, it should be noted that Blair's underlying
assumption that demand is generally more elastic than business-
men thinkl 1 was not supported by the findings of the Kefauver
Subcommittee. So far as steel is concerned, the majority of the
Subcommittee concluded that "a body of knowledge of reasonable
currency does not exist" upon which any reliable conclusions can
be based concerning the elasticity of the demand for steel." z
It suggested that "the steel industry could make a contribution
to knowledge on this subject . . .by making a few price reduc-
tions. '10 3
In spite of its assumption that the elasticity of consumer demand
97. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 93.
98. HANSEN, FISCAL POLICY AND BusInss CYCLES 321 (1941).
99. Id. at 321, n.7.
100. Slichter, Economics and Collective Bargaining, in ECONOMICS
AND THE POLICY MAKER, 117 (1959), reprinted in POTENTIAns OP THE
A~mmucAN ECONOMY 416 (Dunlop ed. 
1961).
101. Blair, supra note 53, at 444.
102. Steel Industry Report 64. The Subcommittee's majority criticized
the elaborate study prepared by Dr. Theodore Yntema for the United
States Steel Corporation and submitted to the TNEC, which concluded
that "the demand for steel is very inelastic." Hearings Before the Tem-
porary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 26, at
13914 (1940).
103. Steel Industry Report 64.
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for automobiles is higher than some experts maintain, the Sub-
committee concluded that "elasticity . . . admittedly is not high
enough to preserve the present level of profits in the face of price
cuts, given the current level of costs in the industry." 10 But the
Subcommittee thought that substantial cuts in the prices of cars
could be made and existing profit levels maintained if "annual
expenditures for styling, advertising and tooling associated with
increasingly frequent model changes . . . were compressed to their
pre-1955 levels."'05
While it may be that these costs of non-price competition in
the automobile industry are wasteful, the Subcommittee did not
make an impressive showing that the maintenance, and even in-
crease, of prices in the face of declining demand in the automobile
and steel industries caused reductions in output in these industries
which would not otherwise have occurred. In his recent book,
Means abandons the problem of elaborating the criteria by which
we should determine what degree of flexibility in industrial prices
will serve the public interest. Instead, he emphasizes that it is the
level of prices arrived at by the private administration of price,
not the inflexibility or the insensitivity to changes in supply and
demand, which is at issue.'
3. Administered Prices and Inflation
(a) Do Administered Prices Cause "Administered Inflation"?
Both Means and Nourse fear that the power of oligopolistic
industries to administer prices may be exercised in a manner that
will feed the inflationary process. Because they earn profits in
excess of those needed to attract capital, the administered-price
industries, it is argued, provoke demands for wage increases. The
managers of these industries are willing to accede to these demands
because they know they have the power to pass on the increases
through higher prices and even to use the occasion to widen profit
margins.' In his recent book, Means adds that the pricing
power possessed by these managers may also be employed to in-
104. Automobile Industry Report 3.
105. Ibid. The majority of the Subcommittee estimated that the Big
Three in the automobile industry spend 1.2-1.3 billion dolars a year
"to promote fictitious style obsolescence." Id. at 147. In Senator Dirksen's
opinion, it was "unwarranted effrontery for any Senate Committee to un-
dertake to advise the automobile industry how to design its cars, how
to secure public appeal for its products, and how best to conduct its busi-
ness." id. at 213.
106. MEANS, op. cit. supra note 61, at 159-60.
107. 1957 Hearings, pt. 1, at 84 (Means); id. at 10-11 (Nourse); 1959
Hearings, pt. 9, at 4703 (Nourse).
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crease prices even when there is no change in costs or demand.Y*s
Means describes the resulting inflation as an "administrative in-
flation," but rejects the implication that "any individual or small
group intentionally creates the inflation."'0 9
To Means, the movement of prices since 1953 demonstrates
the existence of an "administrative inflation." He attributes the
bulk of the price increases before 1953 to the pressure of excess
demand associated with the monetary inflation of World War II
and the Korean War."0 By 1953, he contends, administered
prices, and particularly steel prices, had fully adjusted to the two
war inflations.m Yet during the period after 1953, when there
was no general excess of demand but rather a deficiency in de-
mand and excess capacity, almost all the price increases, according
to Means, occurred in the administered-price industries, while every
price decrease took place in the non-administered price area. For
example, in the period from 1953 until the middle of 1959, when
the long steel strike began, Means points out that the index of
finished steel prices rose to a level 36 percent above that of 1953.
In the same period, the wholesale price index rose only eight
percent, and if the prices of steel and other metal manufactures
are excluded, it rose hardly at all.' Stigler, however, insists
that the "attribution of inflation to monopoly power of enterprises
is ... lacking both a theoretical rationale and an empirical
basis."',
The hearings of the Kefauver Subcommittee dealing with the
relationship between administered prices and inflation were de-
voted, in large part, to an examination of management's charge
that rising wage costs sparked the post-World War II inflations
and labor's countercharge that unduly high profits were respon-
sible. The Subcommittee also raised the question whether the power
to administer prices was not also an inflationary factor to the
extent that it was used for the purpose of internal financing.
(b) The Findings of the Kefauver Subcommittee
(1) On the Wage-Profit Issue
The Subcommittee concentrated its investigation of this issue
on the steel and automobile industries. No company in either
108. MEANS, op. cit. supra note 61, at 62.
109. Ibid.
110. Id. at 113. Means merely elaborates on the testimony he gave be-
fore the Kefauver Subcommittee. 1959 Hearings, pt. 10, at 4897-923.
111. MEANs, op. cit. supra note 61, at 65-111.
112. Id. at 113-14.
113. Stigler, supra note 12, at 9.
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industry, however, furnished the Subcommittee with the unit cost
data necessary to resolve the issue. And the Subcommittee, until
recently, was not prepared to use its subpoena power to compel
the production of the data. The lack of firsthand unit cost data,
however, did not inhibit the expression of Subcommittee opinion.
A majority of the Subcommittee rejected the argument that the
price increases made by the steel and automobile industries in
the face of declining demand were necessitated by rising labor
costs. Furthermore, it concluded that the price increases effected
by the steel industry after the wage increases in July of 1957
widened the industry's profit margin and increased its rate of
return. 14 Similar conclusions were reached with respect to the
wage-price movements in the automobile industry. 11
The wage-profit issue resounded in the April, 1962, controversy
involving the steel industry. The president of United States Steel
sought to justify the announced six dollars per ton increase on the
ground of the "steadily mounting production costs which have
included four increases [amounting to 40 cents an hour] in steel-
worker wages and benefits" between the summer of 1958 (the
time of the last overall price increase) and the end of 1960.111
The wage increases mentioned did not include the new fringe
benefits negotiated just prior to the announced price rise. Adding
the post-1958 increases in employment costs for employees other
than the steelworkers, in the cost of products and services pur-
chased by United States Steel, in state and local taxes, in interest
on money the corporation borrows, and in other expenses, Mr.
Worthington maintained that United States Steel experienced a net
increase of about six percent in its total costs during the period
from 1958 to 1961." The announced increase, consequently,
was only a "partial catch up, . . . considerably short of the
amount needed to restore even the cost-price relationship in the
low production year of 1958.""' A larger increase was not pos-
sible because of "competitive pressures from domestic producers
and from imports of foreign-made steel as well as from other
materials which are used as substitutes for steel.""' 9
President Kennedy, however, stated that he was informed by
the BLS that employment costs per unit of steel output in 1961
were essentially the same as in 1958 and that the cost of steel
scrap and coal-the industry's principal raw materials-had de-
114. Steel Industry Report 33-51.
115. Automobile Industry Report 124-30.
116. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1962, p. 28, col. 2.
117. Id., cols. 2-4.
118. Ibid.
119. Id., col. 2.
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clined since 1958.u While Mr. Worthington claimed that the
steel corporation's profits during 1958-1961 had dropped to the
lowest levels since 1952, 1 President Kennedy stated that its
earnings during the first quarter of 1962 were among the highest
in its history.=
This time the Kefauver Subcommittee sought to ascertain the
facts by using its subpoena power to compel the steel corpo-
rations to submit their unit cost data. United States Steel and eight
other steel companies agreed to furnish the data. But Bethlehem,
Republic, National, and Armco refused to obey the subpoenas,
arguing that disclosure of the cost data would injure their com-
petitive positions vis-d-vis other steel producers and producers
of substitute products at home and abroad. The recalcitrant com-
panies did not think that the secrecy of their data would be pro-
tected by the Subcommittee's proposal to have them submit the
data to the General Accounting Office, which would then furnish
the Subcommittee with combined figures for three or more pro-
ducers.m The Subcommittee recommended to the full Senate
Judiciary Committee that the four recalcitrant companies and nine
of their officers should be cited for contempt of Congress, but the
full Committee refused to do so.' Apparently, as Senator John
Carroll of Colorado explained, the stock market decline and the
lagging economic recovery that followed the President's interven-
tion in April of 1962 (whether propter hoc or merely post hoc
is difficult to say) led many Committee members to think that
the pressing of contempt charges was "not timely."'-
Though lacking adequate data-which apparently will not be
forthcoming soon-Means has attempted to estimate the changes
in the relationship between costs, prices, and profits, in the steel
industry since 1953.126 He cohcludes that there is evidence to
show that the target return of United States Steel "prior to recent
years" was eight percent of its invested capital, after taxes, when
operating at 83 percent of capacity. To enable the industry to
hit this target in 1959, Means estimates, the margin over operating
costs would have had to be 20 percent higher than in 1953. In
fact, Means contends, the margin nearly doubled over this period,
120. Id., April 12, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.
121. Id., April 11, 1962, p. 28, col. 3. From Mr. Blough's subsequent
statement, it is apparent that Mr. Worthington was referring to profit as a
percentage on sales. Id., April 13, 1962, p. 18, col. 2.
122. Id., April 12, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.
123. The above account is based upon the report of Kenneth S. Smith,
appearing in N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1962, § 3, p. 1, col. 4.
124. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1962, p. 52, col. 2.
125. Ibid.
126. MEANs, op. cit. supra note 61, at 112-50.
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and United States Steel's rate of return on invested capital, after
taxes, almost doubled too. Means insists, therefore, that its price
policy in 1959 "was based on a target rate of return of closer to
16 percent."12 In other words, while an eight percent rate of
return on capital, after taxes, in 1959 could have been earned with
steel prices only 15 percent higher than in 1953, in fact prices
in 1959 were 36 percent higher than in 1953.
Means' essential finding that the increases in costs per unit of
steel output since 1953 did not compel the price increases that
have occurred is supported by other studies. Eckstein and Fromm
find that wages in the steel industry rose substantially more than
wages in other industries during the period from 1947 to 1957, in
spite of the fact that the rise in output per man-hour was slightly
less in steel than in manufacturing as a whole.1' Nevertheless,
possession of market power enabled the industry "to maintain and
perhaps increase profit margins" and obtain from profits the funds
to replace existing facilities and expand capacity." Conrad, too,
agrees that
the decline in the share of employee's compensation in durable goods
production [in the period 1947-1956] is not the combined result of
unusual productivity gains, which would have held down unit labor
costs, but of increases in profit rates in steel and automobiles that
were out of line with those generally reported in the rest of the group.
The greater than average wage gains in these industries were not made
at the expense of profits, but were accompanied by increases in the
profit margins.130
Eckstein and Fromm conclude that "the rise in steel prices is
a critical part of the inflation in industrial goods prices" during
the postwar period, 1947 to 1958.'3.
If steel prices had behaved like other industrial prices, the total whole-
sale price index would have risen by 40 percent less over the last
decade and less by 52 percent since 1953. Finished-goods prices would
have risen less by 23 and 38 percent, respectively .... The wage and
price behavior of the steel industry represents an important instance
127. Id. at 147.
128. ECKSTEIN & FROMM, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 86TH CONG., IST
SESS., STEEL AND THE POSTWAR INFLATION 14-21 (Jt. Comm. Print 1959).
129. Id. at 34. The authors conclude that "there is some evidence that
profit margins have been somewhat higher for given rates of utilization
[during the post-war period] than was true earlier." Id. at 25. "Other indus-
tries, whose demand experience was at least equally favorable, did not suc-
ceed in maintaining constant margins" over total cost. Id. at 25-26.
130. CONRAD, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 86TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE
SHARE OF WAGES AND SALARIES IN MANUFACTURING INCOMES, 1947-1956,
147-48 (Jt. Comm. Print 1959).
131. ECKSTEIN & FROMM, op. cit. supra note 128, at 34.
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of inflation caused to a substantial degree by the exercise of market
power.13
2
Demand for steel, while not strong enough to account for these
increases, "nevertheless was strong and inelastic enough to permit
these increases to occur without immediate and telling decline in
the demand for steel."'133
Looking at the period from 1955 to 1958, the Council of
Economic Advisers concluded that there was no general excess
of demand to account for the eight percent rise in consumer prices
and nine percent rise in wholesale prices during this period. The
Council attributed this inflation to the following factors:
IThe existence of relatively high demand, principally in one sector
of the economy [metals and metal products and machinery and mo-
tive products]; the use of market power by management to maintain
profit margins despite rising costs; the exercise of market power by
labor unions in an effort to capture a substantial share of rising profits
for their membership; and the transmission of these developments to
other sectors of the economy.13
(2) On the Issue of Internal Financing
The president of the United States Steel Corporation did not
rely solely upon increases in costs to justify the April, 1962, price
hike. Mr. Worthington maintained that the price increases were
also necessary to generate the funds with which to finance the
plant modernization that would enable United States Steel to com-
pete successfully with lower-cost mills abroad.?a5 He pointed out
that in the three years since the end of 1958, United States Steel
spent 1.185 billion dollars for the replacement and modernization
of its facilities and for the development of new sources of raw
materials. Depreciation reserves accounted for 610 million dollars
of this total and reinvested earnings for 187 million. The remaining
388 million were borrowed. (In fact, he stated that United States
Steel borrowed a total of 800 million dollars during this period.)
Mr. Worthington also claimed that United States Steel had not
increased its dividend rate in more than five years, but President
Kennedy pointed to the fact that the cash dividends paid out by
132. Ibid. The authors recognize that the rise in steel prices "is not
more than a part of the story of inflation in this period, other important
elements being the runup in machinery prices, the rise of construction costs,
the increase in service prices, and, perhaps equally important, the failure
of prices in other fields to fall." Ibid.
133. Ibid.
134. CouNcn. oF ECONONiC ADvisoas ANN. REP. 171 (1962).
135. N.Y. Times, April 11, 1962, p. 28, col. 2.
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United States Steel exceeded 600 million dollars in each of the
preceding five years. 11 6
During the period from 1946 to 1956, the Kefauver Subcom-
mittee found, United States Steel invested 3.766 billion dollars
in new facilities, of which 1.408 billion came from reinvested
earnings.37 Thus, the proportion of new capital derived from
reinvested earnings during the period from 1958 to 1961 (approx-
imately 16 percent) was considerably less than the proportion de-
rived from this source during the period from 1946 to 1956 (ap-
proximately 37 percent). Nevertheless, Mr. Worthington reinforced
a basic thesis of the Kefauver Subcommittee-that the power to
administer prices is exercised so as to produce profits sufficient
not only to pay reasonable dividends to the stockholders, but also
to pay for the current cost of replacing existing capacity and for
a significant portion of the cost of expanding capacity.
This thesis is also buttressed by the Subcommittee's findings
with respect to the automobile industry and by other studies. From
1947 to 1956, General Motors' net worth increased from 1.570
billion dollars to 4.581 billion. Eighty-seven percent of this three
billion dollar increase came from retained profits; only 390 mil-
lion dollars (13 percent) did not.' As of December 31, 1957,
GM's capital totalled 4.905 billion dollars, of which 3.701 billion
represented profits retained for use in the business.'39
The Survey of Current Business reports that of the 289.7 billion
dollars in capital funds used by corporate business (other than
banks and insurance companies) in the postwar decade, 1947-
1956, 60 percent came from retained profits and depreciation
allowances; 20 percent was borrowed, chiefly from banks; and
20 percent came from the capital markets. 4" Professor A. A.
Berle, Jr., estimates that the bulk of the 20 percent raised in the
capital markets was invested by insurance companies, mutual funds,
and pension trusts; perhaps five percent of this 20 percent was in-
vested by individuals.'
136. Id., April 11, 1962, p. 28, col. 3; id., April 12, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.
137. 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, at 398, 403.
138. 1958 Hearings, pt. 6, at 2208-09; pt. 7, at 3862.
139. Id., pt. 7, at 3864.
140. Survey of Current Business, Sept. 1957, p. 8, quoted in BERLE,
POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 39 (1959).
141. BERLE, op. cit. supra note 140, at 43-45. For the period 1947-
1958, Houthakker reports that corporations other than banks and insurance
companies invested a total of $412 billion; of this amount, $255 billion,
or 62 percent, came from retained profits; $61 billion from bank loans;
$52 billion from the sale of bonds; $29 billion, or seven percent, from the
sale of common and preferred stocks; and $15 billion from other external
long-term sources. HOUTHAKKER, JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 86TH CONG.,
1ST SEss., PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION 121 (Jt. Comm. Print 1959).
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Of the 173.3 billion dollars of capital used by the manufac-
turing and mining industries during this decade, about 33 percent
came from retained profits and 30 percent from depreciation re-
serves. The railroad industry used 11.7 billion dollars, of which
37 percent came from retained profits and 43 percent from de-
preciation reserves. Other forms of transportation used 12.5 bil-
lion dollars, of which 11 percent came from retained profits and
50 percent from depreciation reserves. The public utility and com-
munication industries used 55.9 billion dollars, but because their
rates are regulated, only three percent came from retained profits
and 26 percent from depreciation reserves. 42
The profits thus earned for the purpose of reinvestment gave
labor a plausible basis for pressing its demands for higher wages,
and thereby intensified the inflationary process.14
(c) Evaluation of the Findings
(1) Concentration and Economic Growth
Essentially, then, the Kefauver Subcommittee is concerned that
profits are too high in the industries in which the managers exer-
cise a wide discretion to determine prices. While it is true that
oligopoly prices normally yield a higher margin over costs than
competitive prices, the Kefauver Subcommittee concluded that in
the postwar years oligopolistic industries tended to increase their
relative profit margins and thereby set off an "administrative in-
flation." The Council of Economic Advisers has elaborated this
concept of "administrative inflation" as follows:
Upward pressure on prices may originate in those sectors of the
economy where competitive forces are weak and large corporations
and unions have a considerable degree of discretion in setting prices
and wages .... There are two ways in which wage and price decisions
in these sectors may put upward pressure on the general price level.
First, prices may be increased when demand is not strong in the ag-
gregate or even in the specific industries involved. Because the prices
of these industries affect costs elsewhere, increases in their prices tend
to spread throughout the economy. Second, prices in these sectors may
remain constant in the face of declining demand, although they rise
142. BER.E, op. cit. supra note 140, at 39-42. It may be pointed out,
incidentally, that the respective percentages for the regulated industries
may constitute a fairly reliable index of the effectiveness of rate regulation.
Internal financing may be even more significant for the larger corpo-
rations. The financial data compiled by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System show that in the period 1950-1956, 200 large
manufacturing companies added $19 billion to their net capital; S17 billion
represented retained profits, and $2 billion (less than seven percent) was
accounted for by the sale of stocks. MEANs, op. cit. supra note 61, at 270.
143. See id. at 159-60.
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in times of increasing demand. The result in the long run is an up-
ward drift in prices in these industries which again tends to be trans-
mitted to the whole economy. 44
Oligopolistic pricing, therefore, is presumed to be contrary to
the public interest because its total effect is to impede the possi-
bility of sustaining full employment and a satisfactory rate of
economic growth. It is true that our economy has not been per-
forming satisfactorily in these important respects. While the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers suggests a maximum unemployment
rate of four percent of the civilian labor force as "a reasonable
and prudent full employment target for stabilization policy, '' 45
the unemployment rate has exceeded four percent in every year
since 1954, reaching a peak of 6.9 percent during 1961.146 In
September, 1962, 5.8 percent of the civilian labor force remained
unemployed. 4 7 Although the Council suggests 4.5 percent as the
target annual rate of growth of output for the 1960's,"48 in fact
the gross national product (in 1961 prices) grew at an average
annual rate of only 3.5 percent during the period from 1947 to
1960 (3.8 percent on the average from 1947 to 1954 and 3.2
percent on the average from 1954 to 1960).111 Since the end
of World War II, we have experienced four recessions-in 1948-
1949, 1953-1954, 1957-1958, and 1960-1961."'o Recovery seems
to be progressively more difficult to achieve after each recession,
measured by the percentage of the labor force remaining unem-
ployed at the peak of recovery."' As a result, underutilization
of our plant and equipment capacity is becoming chronic. The
Council of Economic Advisers estimates that full utilization of our
existing capacity would mean full employment, that is, no more
than four percent of our labor force would be unemployed.'
However, whether the poor performance of our economy is due
to the concentration of economic power and whether its perform-
ance would be improved if our economy became more competiti'c
are questions to which answers are by no means certain. The
144. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 45-46 (1962).
145. Id. at 46.
146. Id. at 230-31. Even a four percent rate would result in a not incon-
siderable amount of unemployment.
147. Minneapolis Morning Tribune, Oct. 5, 1962, p. 18, col. 1, reporting
Department of Labor figures.
148. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 114-15 (1962). Pro-
fessor Berle and others have suggested a five percent annual rate of growth.
BERLE, Op. cit. supra note 140, at 121.
149. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 113 (1962).
150. Id. at 56.
151. Id. at 230.
152. Id. at 54.
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Kefauver Subcommittee, for example, attempted to link oligopoly
in the steel industry with technological backwardness.' Eckstein
and Fromm also report that according "to a study conducted by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau for the
National Science Foundation, the primary metal industries were
among the lowest in the percentage of their sales dollar spent on
research and development in the last decade."'" Means explains
that the reason for this is that the high, noncompetitive, target
rate of return at which the steel industry aims slows investment
in new technology.155 Recently, too, the Kefauver Subcommittee
has announced that it will investigate the charge that the pricing
policies of concentrated industries may be responsible for the de-
cline in real exports of these industries which has affected their
total output.5 65 The New York Times reports that the steel
production of the United States in 1960 was only ten percent
higher than in 1954, while in the same period the six nations of
the European Common Market increased their steel production
by 66 percent. In ten years, the United States' share of the world
steel trade dropped from 17 percent to about seven percent, and
American imports of steel have risen to a point where they exceed
exports in some months."5 '
The particular case against the steel industry is persuasive. Yet
there is a considerable and respected body of opinion to the effect
that oligopolistic industries generally intensify the pace of techno-
logical advance.' s There are other obstacles in the way of as-
suming that a more competitive economy would so allocate re-
sources as to produce a larger volume of goods and services. How
shall we compare the efficiency of a hypothetical economic order
that is more competitive in the classical sense with an existing,
functioning economic order characterized by large-scale enterprise
and oligopolistic competition? There is no body of data correlating
degrees of competition with degrees of efficiency, and Professor
Edward S. Mason acknowledges that "there is an element of faith
in the proposition that maintaining competition substantially im-
proves the efficiency of resource use."' 59 Means, on the contrary,
warns that if existing oligopolies are broken up into a larger num-
153. 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, at 673-712, 752-92; pt. 4, at 1371-72.
154. ECKSTEiN & FRoMm, op. cit. supra note 128, at 22 n.26. For United
States Steel's reply to these charges, see 1957 Hearings, pt. 3, at 1057-60.
155. MEANs, op. cit. supra note 61, at 273-74.
156. S. REP. No. 14, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1961).
157. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1962, § 4, p. 1, cols. 1, 2.
158. See MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
IssuEs 22-25 (1962) and authorities cited therein.
159. Preface to KAYSEN & TuRNER, ANTITRUST POLICY at xx (1959).
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ber of business entities, oligopoly profits may be eliminated, but
only by wastefully increasing costs and not by lowering prices
to the consumer. 160
The experience of other countries, furthermore, makes it dif-
ficult to share Professor Mason's faith. It is commonly accepted
that the Soviet Union has increased its industrial production at a
more rapid rate than the United States, and, needless to say, the
Soviet economy is not competitive in the sense in which we use
that term. We may argue that this comparison is unfair; that no
economy "can guarantee as high a rate of capital formation as a
dictatorial economy that is prepared to squeeze forced savings out
of the consumer.' 161 But then, during the period from 1950 to
1959, when the average annual rate of growth of the gross na-
tional product, per man-year, was 2.2 percent in the United States,
it was 2.8 percent in Sweden, 3.1 percent in Norway, 3.4 percent
in the Netherlands, 3.6 percent in France, 4.5 percent in Germany,
4.7 percent in Italy, and 6.1 percent in Japan.'62 In 1960, too,
the unemployment rate in the United States was considerably
higher than the rate in these countries.6 3 Yet it cannot be said
that the non-dictatorial economies of these countries are more
competitive than the economy of the United States.
Nevertheless, we need not be too defensive about these com-
parisons. The existing structure and organization of our economy
have not been obstacles to the production of a flood of goods and
services of constantly better quality at prices that have permitted
the real standard of living of our people to improve steadily. Since
1939, for example, real average weekly earnings in manufacturing
industries increased almost 90 percent.' We are concerned about
the current performance of the economy because it is not fulfilling
its potential and realizing, at a fast enough rate, its promise of
eliminating economic scarcity.
(2) Concentration and the Distribution of Income and
Wealth
Professor J. K. Galbraith is persuaded that "few things are
160. MEANS, op. cit. supra note 61, at 213-31.
161. WALLICH, THE COST OF FREEDOM 63 (1960).
162. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 114 (1962).
163. Using comparable standards, a presidential committee studying sta-
tistics on employment and unemployment concluded that the unemploy-
ment rate in the United States was 5.6 percent, while it was 1.9 percent
in France, 1 percent in Germany, 2.4 percent in Great Britain, 4.3 percent
in Italy, 1.1 percent in Japan, and 1.5 percent in Sweden. Of the countries
studied, only Canada had a higher unemployment rate (seven percent)
than the United States. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1962, § 1, p. 43, cols. 1, 2.
164. COUNCIL OF EcoNoMIc ADVISERS ANN. REP. 242 (1962).
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more evident in modern social history than the decline of interest
in equality as an economic issue" and that this "has been particu-
larly true in the United States."' Whether interest in this issue
should be reawakened, however, may depend upon the extent to
which our economy has succeeded in eliminating sharp inequalities.
It is pertinent, therefore, to inquire whether the concentration of
economic power exacerbates inequalities in the distribution of in-
come and wealth. Apart from the ethical problems of inequality,
the maldistribution of income and wealth may be a contributing
cause of the deficiency in demand that afflicts our economy with
idle capacity and inhibits our economic growth.
The Kefauver Subcommittee has not concerned itself with the
question of the distribution of income and wealth in the United
States. It sought to publicize the huge salaries and opportunities
for profit through stock options that corporation executives in
oligopolistic industries have procured for themselves. 1" But it
wished thereby to demonstrate the self-interest that these men have
in higher prices and higher profits and not the unequal distri-
bution of income.
Poverty in the United States. Our "affluent" society has not
succeeded in abolishing poverty. Professor Robert J. Lampman
estimates that there were 32.2 million Americans (or 19 percent
of the population) in a "low-income status" in 1957-a status
barely above that required for subsistence.' The Council of
Economic Advisers reports in 1962 that "about 30 percent of all
families and unrelated persons have less than $1,000 of money
income per person, and are now below the level that the average
American achieved a quarter-century ago." '
165. GALBRAXT, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 82 (1958).
166. See, e.g., 1957 Hearings, pt. 2, at 370, 553-609; pt. 4, at 1346-63,
1392-97; Steel Industry Report 107-12.
167. LAmpmN, JoINT ECONOMIC COMM., 86TH CONG., lST SEss., THE
Low INCOME PoPuLATioN AND ECONOMIC GRoWTH 4-5 (Comm. Print
1959). Professor Lampman defines a "low-income person" as "one with
an income equivalent to that of a member of a four-person family with
total money income of not more than $2,500 in 1957 dollars." On this
basis, a single individual is classified as a low-income person if he had
income in 1957 under $1,157; a two-person family is so classified if it had
income under $1,638; a three-person family, if it had income under S2,016;
a four-person family, if it had income under $2,516; a five-person family,
if it had income under $2,888; a six-person family, if it had income under$3,236; and a family of seven or more, if it had income under $3,750. Pro-
fessor Lampman's standard contrasts with the $4,000 per year that the
BLS estimated was necessary in 1957 for an urban family of four to main-
tain an "adequate standard of living." His standard, however, is well
above the budget levels used in determining need for public assistance in
most states. Ibid.
168. CouiNcm OF ECONOMIC ADvISERS ANN. REP. 109 (1962).
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Yet the reasons why these people suffer poverty have little to do
with the structure and organization of the industrial order. Pro-
fessor Lampman finds that in 1957 about 22.5 million low-income
persons (70 percent of the total) had one or more of these handi-
capping characteristics-65 years of age or older (eight million
or 25 percent of the total); nonwhite (6.4 million or 20 percent
of the total); in consumer units headed by women (eight million
or 25 percent of the total); and in consumer units headed by a
person with eight grades or less of schooling (21 million or 65
percent of the total).169 About 25 percent of all low-income
persons (eight million) were in rural farm residence, and 40 per-
cent (12.9 million) lived in the South. 7 At least 34 percent of
the low-income persons (11 million) were children under 18;
this meant that 20 percent of all children under 18 were low-
income persons.'
"One of the most remarkable characteristics of the low-income
family heads," Lampman finds, "is the low degree of partici-
pation in employment."'7 One-third of all low-income persons
were in consumer units headed by a person in nonemployed status;
the heads of 4.2 of the 8.7 million families with incomes under
2,500 dollars were in the Armed Forces or not employed; one-
third of low-income family heads were retired. 7'
Of the employed families with less than 2,500 dollars of income,
one-third were in agriculture, forestry, and fishing and one-half
were farmers or unskilled workers.174
Professor Galbraith has argued that the poverty remaining in
the United States "is not efficiently remedied by a general and
tolerably well-distributed advance in income," because it is the
result primarily of some handicapping characteristic of the poverty-
stricken individuals or of the unwillingness or inability of these
individuals to leave the geographical "island of poverty in which
they were born."'75 However, Lampman shows that over the
period from 1947 to 1957, the proportion of the population in
low-income status declined from 26 percent to 19 percent (more
than one-fourth of the way toward zero), despite the increase in
169. LAMPMAN, Op. cit. supra note 167, at 4. "If the 32.2 million under
discussion had the same characteristics as the general population only 2.9
percent would be aged, 3.2 would be nonwhite, 3.2 would be in units headed
by a female and 15 would be headed by a person with educational attain-
ment of no more than 8 grades." Id. at 12.
170. Id. at 7, 8.
171. Id. at 7.
172. Id. at 10.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid.
175. GALBRAITH, op. cit. supra note 165, at 327.
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average family size, the aging of the adult population, and a large
shift out of employment. 6 He attributes this reduction in poverty
in significant measure to the movement of persons from low-in-
come areas, particularly from the farm.r Nevertheless, Lampman
recognizes the "limited validity of Galbraith's thesis insofar as it
is not likely that economic growth alone will alleviate the poverty
of those individuals possessing the handicapping characteristics of
old-age, or female sex, or physical, mental or emotional difficul-
ties."'78 But he thinks that economic growth in the future will
help nonwhite persons to rise out of poverty, as it will require
and make possible increased educational opportunities for those
now deprived of these opportunities. 7 9
The Extent of Inequality. Gabriel Kolko contends that a "radi-
cally unequal distribution of income has been characteristic of the
American social structure since at least 1910" and presents data
showing that "throughout the 1950's, the income of the top tenth
[of income recipients] was larger than the total for the bottom
five income-tenths-about the same relationship as existed in
1910 and 1918."'8° Lampman tends to corroborate these data;
he points out that the lowest two-tenths of all income recipients
received about five percent of the total income in the 1930's, in
1947, and in 1957."8 These lowest two-tenths constitute the
groups in low-income status, as defined by Lampman. The com-
position of the low-income group and the validity, if only limited,
of Galbraith's thesis, goes far to explain why this group's share
of the total income has not increased over time. It would not be
reasonable to conclude that the concentration of economic power
was responsible for this fact.
Excluding the lowest one-fifth of all income receivers, there
has been some trend toward a less unequal distribution of income.
Even the data adduced by Kolko show that the percentage of
national personal income, before taxes, received by the highest
income-tenth of recipients fell from 39 percent in 1929 to 28.9
percent in 1959; the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh
income-tenths each increased its share; the share of the eighth
income-tenth remained the same; and the shares of the lowest
ninth and tenth income-tenths fell.8 2 Lampman agrees that the
176. LAmPmAN, op. cit. supra note 167, at 4.
177. Id. at 25.
178. Id. at 26-28.
179. Ibid.
180. KoLK O, WEA.T AND PowEn IN AMEmmcA 13-14 (1962).
181. LAmpmAN, op. cit. supra note 167, at 24, 29.
182. KoLiKo, op. cit. supra note 180. Kolko's data on the lowest two-
tenths of income recipients are not in line with Lampman's finding that
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"top [income] group's share has been lowered at the expense of
a gain in share by the upper middle group."'83 The best esti-
mates of income distribution after taxes do not change the picture
materially."'
However, Kolko finds, as did Lampman, that most of the lowest
fourth-tenths of income recipients consist of service workers, un-
skilled laborers, and farm operators, while most skilled workers
are in the fourth and fifth highest income-tenths, and most semi-
skilled workers are in the fifth and sixth income-tenths." 5 Thus,
there is little basis for concluding that the concentration of Ameri-
can industry is responsible for the fact that the share of income
received by the lowest 30 percent of income recipients has re-
mained virtually the same since 1929. The people in this lowest
group are not generally employed by the concentrated industries.
On the whole, the workers and white-collar employees in the con-
centrated industries have not only increased their real incomes,
but also their shares of total income at the expense of the highest
income-receivers. Concentration may inhibit the trend toward less
inequality insofar as it may be said to inhibit economic growth,
but it cannot be assumed that the fostering of greater competition
will be more likely to induce economic growth and narrow in-
equality. Professor Berle reminds us that experience refutes such
an assumption when he writes: "Highly competitive industries car-
ried on by a multiplicity of small-scale producers frequently ex-
hibited wide fluctuations in production and price and unbearable
conditions of employment, while freedom to enter or leave the
industry often meant little more than an annual grist of bank-
ruptcies."' 6
To stimulate economic growth and narrow inequalities in the
distribution of income and wealth, greater reliance will have to
be placed upon Government tax and spending policies than upon
policies to promote competition. Whether the groups that will not
their shares of income have remained stationary since the 1930's. Herman
P. Miller has concluded: "In 1935, the poorest 20 per cent of families re-
ceived only 4 per cent of the income. Their share rose to 5 per cent in
1944 and has remained at that level ever since." Miller, Is The Income Gap
Closed? "No!", N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1962, § 6 (Magazine), p. 50. Miller
tends to support Lampman's conclusion. It is not clear what data Miller
relies upon, and Lampman and Kolko use different methods of calculating
the distribution of income.
183. LAMPMAN, op. cit. supra note 167, at 29.
184. KOLKO, op. cit. supra note 180, at 30-45. Miller estimates that in
recent years "the wealthiest 5 per cent [of families] received 20 per cent of
the income before taxes and about 18 per cent of the income after Fed-
eral individual income tax payments were deducted." Miller, supra note 182.
185. KOLKO, op. cit. supra note 180, at 83.
186. BERLE, op. cit. supra note 140, at 89.
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benefit from the process of economic growth will be lifted out
of poverty will depend upon whether our programs of education,
vocational guidance and rehabilitation, social insurance and public
assistance, are expanded; low-income farmers are encouraged to
move into other occupations; depressed agricultural communities
and other distressed areas are developed; and racial discrimination
is eliminated.1 7
Administered Prices and Wages and Inequalities in the Dis-
tribution of Wage Income. Professor Daniel Bell has charged that
the power to administer prices and wages has exacerbated inequali-
ties in the distribution of income because it has been used to bene-
fit the members of strong unions bargaining with corporations
possessing market power and the stockholders and executives of
these corporations, but only at the expense of "unorganized
workers (e.g., textile workers) in marginal industries, rentiers,
pensioners, and the like"-the groups that always suffer from
inflation.l" Basic to Professor Bell's argument is his assumption
that unions affect only the structure of wages (the relationship
between the wages of the organized workers relative to the wages
of the unorganized) and not the level of wages ("the total wage
bill in relation to other economic factors"). s9 In answer to Pro-
fessor Bell, Arthur J. Goldberg maintained that "collective bar-
gaining has had, and certainly can have, an effect in increasing
labor's share of the total product, both directly and by inducing
increases in productivity"; he expressed the "firm view" that "the
pressure of the rise of wages in steel and auto has helped to raise
the wages of lower-paid groups." '
187. See LAMPmAN, op. cit. supra note 167, at 31. Steps in the direc-
tions advocated have been taken recently. See, e.g., Manpower Development
and Training Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 23, which "seeks to deal with one
major aspect of the problem of unemployment in the United States by
enabling workers whose skills have become obsolete to receive training
which will qualify them to obtain and hold jobs," S. REP. No. 651, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Area Redevelopment Act, 75 Stat. 47 (1961),
which seeks "to alleviate conditions of substantial and persistent unem-
ployment and underemployment in certain economically distressed areas,"
H.R. REP. No. 186, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); Public Works Ac-
celeration Act, 76 Stat. 541 (1962), which "authorizes the appropriation
of not more than $900 million to be used to accelerate the construction
of necessary public works as a means of expanding employment opportun-
ities" in distressed areas, H.R. REP. No. 1756, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962);
and Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, 76 Stat. 172, which extend and
improve the public assistance and child welfare service programs of the
Social Security Act.
188. Bell, The Subversion of Collective Bargaining, 29 CoMMENTARY
185 (1960).
189. Id. at 189.
190. Goldberg, Collective Bargaining, Goals and Achievements, 30 CoM-
ImraurARy 60, 63 (1960). See Bell's reply, id. at 64.
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Though the issue debated by Professor Bell and Mr. Justice
Goldberg is crucial, it is difficult to resolve because of the problem
of estimating what the situation would be if there were no unions
with the power to administer wages and no corporations with the
power to administer prices. It has been argued that "there are
no significant differentials between the rates of workers in union
and nonunion plants."'' If this is so, two conflicting conclusions
follow-that even strong unions cannot affect the wage rates paid
their members or that increases in union rates help to bring up
nonunion rates. In the former case, the assumptions of both Pro-
fessor Bell and Mr. Justice Goldberg are unwarranted; in the latter,
Mr. Justice Goldberg's firm view is supported. In either case, the
position that strong unions benefit their members at the expense
of unorganized workers is refuted.
Professor Robert Ozanne has sought to test the alternatives by
measuring the impact of unions on the level of wages and the dis-
tribution of income through a comparison of wage gains in manu-
facturing during a nonunion period, 1923-1929, with wage gains
during a union period, 1947-1955.192 On the basis of these limited
data, Ozanne concluded that (1) unionization creates the power
to administer wages; (2) it is probable "that gains which went
to union workers were not made at the expense of nonunion em-
ployees"; 93 and (3) the gains made by all employees during the
union period were made at the expense of profits in the sense
that the distributive share of profits before taxes would have been
greater in the absence of unionization. The "actual losers" during
the union period were the recipients of rental and unincorporated
income. 9' Ozanne's conclusions thus support Mr. Justice Gold-
berg's view.
191. Maher, Union, Nonunion Wage Differentials, 46 AM. ECON. REV.
336, 352 (1956).
192. Ozanne, Impact of Unions on Wage Levels and Income Distribu-
tion, 73 Q.J. EcoN. 177 (1959).
193. Id. at 188.
194. Id. at 193. Ozanne found that:
(1) Real average hourly earnings of production workers in manu-
facturing in the union period rose over twice as rapidly as in the non-
union period . . . although increase in productivity in manufacturing
as measured by change in physical output per man hour was greater
in the nonunion period ....
(2) Average annual compensation per full-time employee (all indus-
tries) rose less than per capita personal income in the nonunion period
but exceeded gains in per capita personal income in the union period
(3) The rate of increase in average annual incomes of white collar
workers in manufacturing far outdistanced that of production workers
in the same industries in the nonunion period. In the union period the
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The Council of Economic Advisers has commented on the effect
of unionization in the post-World War II years, reflected in the
contrast between the earnings and employment of salaried and
production workers in manufacturing, as follows:
Although aggregate salaries in manufacturing have risen twice as
rapidly as aggregate wages, annual disbursements per worker for
salaried workers increased at an average rate of only 3.8 percent a
year during the period 1947-61, while disbursements per production
worker increased at a rate of 4.9 percent. At the same time, the num-
ber of salaried workers was increasing at a rate of 3.7 percent a year,
and the number of production workers declining at a rate of 0.5 per-
cent.1 95
In the absence of accepted standards of equity, it is as difficult
to say whether these are "just" consequences of unionism as it is
to say whether a target rate of return of 16 percent, rather than
eight percent, is "just" for the steel industry. Nor is much gained
by blaming unions, as Bell does, for the "subversion" of the col-
lective bargaining process;""8 or blaming industry, as Mr. Justice
Goldberg does, for its "exorbitant pricing policies."'' Both labor
and management are acting in accordance with the impersonal
logic of the situation that gives them the power that accompanies
control of large blocks of human and material resources. Never-
theless, it remains a fact that the process of contention between
strongly organized groups in our society (even if no one of them
is strong enough to overpower the others) will not necessarily
produce desirable results for the society as a whole. A twentieth-
rate of increase in average annual incomes of production workers
slightly exceeded that of white collar workers ....
(4) In the nonunion period the rate of increase in average annual
incomes of production workers lagged well behind the rate of increase
in per capita personal income. In the union period the situation was
reversed .... Average hourly earnings of production workers in manu-
facturing showed the same trends ....
(5) Three out of four groups which were partially organized in the
twenties showed greater relative gain in the 1947-55 period as their
degree of unionization rose to nearly 100 per cent. (Bituminous coal,
Class I railroads, and printing...).
(6) Wage movements in the union period show surprising indepen-
dence of market demand for labor ....(7) The distributive share of employees remained constant in the non-
union period. It rose in the union period ....
(8) The distributive share of profits before taxes (adjusted for in-
ventory changes) rose in the nonunion period and remained relatively
stable in the union period ....
Id. at 195.
195. CouNcn. OF ECONOMic ADvisERs ANN. REP. 176 (1962).
196. Bell, supra note 188, at 195.
197. Goldberg, supra note 190, at 62.
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century policy of "laissez-faire the group" is as inadequate as was
the nineteenth-century policy of "laissez-faire the individual." But
the problem of defining and enforcing what is desirable for the
society as a whole is still unresolved.
Internal Financing and the Distribution of Wealth. Reinvested
profits have operated as a factor increasing the concentration of
wealth since 1949. Professor Lampman reports that the share of
wealth held by the top two percent of families fell from 33 percent
in 1922 to 29 percent in 1953 and that the share held by the top
one percent of adults fell from 32 percent to 25 percent over this
period. However, Lampman also finds that the concentration of
wealth has been increasing since 1949 and attributes this trend
to the fact that corporate saving has enabled the top wealth-holders
to offset their losses on income account by gaining on capital
account. 19
Professor Bell argues that internal financing is a "hidden tax
mechanism" by which "a corporation can, through a protected
price policy, 'tax' consumers for its own purposes and do whatever
it wishes with the money."' 99 If we accept the premises of existing
law, Bell's characterization of internal financing is not apt. Under
existing law, all profits earned by a corporation-whether dis-
tributed as dividends or retained for investment in the business-
belong to the stockholders. Retained profits increase the stock-
holders' "equity"-the value of their ownership rights-in the
corporation, just as if all the profits had been distributed to them
as dividends and they had purchased additional stock in the cor-
poration in the amount of the retained profits. No particular portion
of the total profits can be singled out for description as the fruit
of a "tax." But there is a sense in which Bell's description may be
valuable. Internal financing operates as a "hidden tax mechanism"
198. LAMPMAN, THE SHARE OF Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL
WEALTH, 1922-1956 (1962). The share of wealth held by the top one
percent of adults rose to 38 percent in 1929, fell to 22 percent in 1949 and
rose to 25 percent in 1953. Id. at 244.
The point Lampman makes can best be appreciated by pondering over
some comparisons suggested by Mr. Walter Reuther, president of the United
Automobile Workers, to the Kefauver Subcommittee. Mr. Reuther pointed
out that in 1947 an investment of $52,000 in 1,003 shares of GM stock
would have earned $3,009 in dividends for that year. This $3,009 is what
the average GM worker would have earned in 1947 if he worked the full
year. If the worker continued to work a full year each of the next 10 years,
he would have earned a total of $46,000. But if the stockholder sold his
1,003 shares of stock in September, 1957, he would have received $284,000
for his original investment, including dividends over the years and capital
gains. A $9,000 investment in GM stock in 1947 would have yielded the
investor the same amount in 1957 that the average GM worker earned
during the whole period. 1958 Hearings, pt. 6, at 2260.
199. Bell, supra note 188, at 186.
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that does not benefit the "taxpayer" (consumer) if it results in
higher prices and profits than would prevail if the nonregulated,
oligopolistic industries relied upon the capital markets for capital
to finance the expansion of their productive facilities to the same
extent as do the regulated industries.
Judging by the explanation that the steel and automobile
executives gave to the Kefauver Subcommittee of the factors that
influence their pricing decisions, we must conclude that the policy
of internal financing does result in such higher prices and profits.
This explanation was reiterated when both Mr. Worthington and
Mr. Blough sought to use the policy of internal financing to justify
the price increase announced by United States Steel in April of
1962. Mr. Blough thus stated the principle that guided his de-
cision: "The profits which any company has left over after paying
its employees, its other expenses, the tax collector and its stock-
holders for the use of their resources, are the main source of the
plants and equipment that provide the work that thousands of
workers have now." In response to a reporter's question, Blough
indicated that United States Steel would take into consideration in
pricing steel any "changes in the tax laws that are beneficial from
the standpoint of depreciation" and that would, thereby, diminish
the need for price increases to raise the capital funds for the
modernization and expansion of productive facilities. - 0
The merits of internal financing have been hotly debated.2 1
To require industry to pay out to its stockholders substantially
all its profits would curb the power of management by compelling
it periodically to run the gauntlet of approval in the markets for
capital. On the other hand, internal financing performs the function
of a compulsory savings arrangement, administered by corporate
enterprise, which a consumption-oriented society may need badly.
Internal financing may also be a more economical way of raising
capital because it saves the approximately two dollars and sixty
cents per 100 dollars that it costs to raise capital by the sale of
stocks. 20
2
If internal financing accords with the public interest, then the
current corporate income tax laws need to be re-evaluated. Since
52 percent of all corporate income is paid out in taxes, prices must
be high enough to yield more than two dollars of retained profits
for every one dollar the corporation plans to keep for investment
200. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1962, p. 18 (transcript of news conference
held by Roger M. Blough on April 12, 1962).
201. See Brewster, The Corporation and Economic Federalism, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SocIETY 72, 81-84 (Mason ed. 1959); Lintner,
The Financing of Corporations, id. at 166.
202. MEANs, PRInCIG POWER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 269 (1962).
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in new plant and equipment. The tax system thus doubles the
inflationary impact of internal financing. No industry representa-
tive appearing before the Kefauver Subcommittee suggested that
reinvested profits be exempt from tax, in whole or in part. Such
a suggestion was made by Mr. Frederick R. Kappel, President
of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, in his capa-
city as a member of the Research and Policy Committee of the
Committee for Economic Development." 3 The C.E.D. itself
merely proposed that taxpayers be permitted to write-off the cost
of investment at a faster rate than the tax laws then provided.0 4
Elements of both these suggestions have been adopted recently.
The Treasury Department has promulgated new rules permitting
a shortening of the depreciable lives of plant and equipment and
the Revenue Act of 1962 allows a credit against any income tax
due of an amount not exceeding seven percent of the cost of in-
vestment in machinery and equipment on or after January 1,
1962."15 It is estimated that these two measures will mean a tax
saving of approximately 2.5 billion dollars a year to American
industry." 6 Whether they will stimulate new investment and re-
duce the pressure, pro tanto, to secure the investment funds out
of prices remains to be seen.
In any case, to whom, in equity, should the "compulsory sav-
ings" exacted by a policy of internal financing (or tax subsidy)
belong? Retained profits (in excess of the amount necessary to
yield "reasonable" dividends) would represent savings to the con-
sumer if management established prices so as not to yield any
return on the cost of facilities purchased with such profits. But
it is clear that no such policy could be enforced without govern-
mental price control. If, however, internal financing is of concern
primarily because of its effect upon the distribution of wealth,
and not because of its inflationary impact, other alternatives may
203. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH AND TAXES
19 (1961). To stimulate expenditures for new plant and equipment, Mr.
Kappel proposed "a lower tax rate on a part of income proportionate to
the increase in investment." For example, "if a taxpayer's investment in
plant and equipment increased by 5 percent in a given taxable year, then
5 percent of his taxable income for that year would be exempted from
surtax or from a stated number of percentage points of tax." Ibid.
204. Ibid.
205. See New Depreciation Guidelines and Rules, Rev. Proc. 62-21,
1962 INT. REV. BULL. No. 30, at 6; Revenue Act of 1962, § 2, 76 Stat.
960. The tax credit may not exceed an amount equal to the first $25,000
of the taxpayer's tax liability plus 25 percent of its liability in excess of
$25,000. The taxpayer is required to reduce its base for the depreciation
of property by the amount of the credit it takes.
206. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1962, § 3, p. 12 (report of Richard E.
Mooney).
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be available. Means remarked during the course of the hearings
of the Kefauver Subcommittee that "if the corporation would issue
a piece of a share of stock to each purchaser of steel in proportion
to the contribution that purchaser is making to capital, then justice
would be done."2 ' To measure this contribution, however, would
require governmental determination of "reasonable" dividends-
and possibly even limitation of dividends. Such government in-
tervention, however, would not limit managerial discretion as much
as price control. To put it mildly, however, effectuation of Means'
objective would present perplexing problems of administration-
how, for example, would we identify the buyers who paid the
prices that produced the retained profits?
One way to assure more widespread ownership of the facilities
purchased with retained profits-in the interest of a more equit-
able distribution of income and wealth-is to encourage corpora-
tions to adopt profit-sharing plans under which stock representing
the cost of these facilities would be distributed to their employees.
This suggestion is in part embodied in the first profit-sharing plan
in the automobile industry negotiated by American Motors Corpo-
ration and the United Automobile Workers. Under this plan, 15
percent of the corporation's profits before taxes on products man-
ufactured in the United States, after an amount equal to ten percent
of its adjusted net worth is deducted from these profits, will be dis-
tributed among the corporation's workers. Ten percent will be dis-
tributed in the form of fringe benefits such as pensions and health
insurance and five percent in the form of stock.218 As stock-
holders, the employees will benefit from the increases in the stock-
holders' equity produced by retained profits.
Obviously, however, it is difficult to justify a policy under
which the facilities internally financed would belong, entirely,
to the employees of the corporation rather than to the consumers
who paid for them. It may be that the only practical way of bene-
fiting these consumers is to make the Government of the United
207. 1959 Hearings, pt. 9, at 4776. Means destroys the point he is making
by stating that the price of steel would not be lower if internal financing were
not relied upon by the companies and all earnings were distributed to the
stockholders. Id. at 4777.
208. N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1962, § 1, p. 142 (report of Damon Stetson).
In the first year of the plan's operation, the 27,000 factory workers covered
by the agreement were allotted $9,766,907, of which S6,511,271 went for
fringe benefits and $3,255,636 for the purchase of 197,311 shares of stock
or 7.3 shares per worker. The American Motors Corporation inaugurated
a similar plan for its 5,200 salaried employees. These employees were
allotted $2,604,277 under the plan, of which $1,736,185 went to finance
fringe benefits and $868,092 for the purchase of 52,611 shares of stock.
Minneapolis Morning Tribune, Nov. 16, 1962, p. 9.
1962]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
States the owner of new stock representing the amount of profits
in excess of that which would have been earned if prices had been
fixed to return the competitive cost of capital. Some procedure
similar to that now used for the renegotiation of Government con-
tracts could be employed to determine the amount of these excess
profits. Furthermore, the tax on such excess profits could then be
eliminated. To assure that the Government would never be in a
position to gain control of the enterprise, the stock issued to it
could be nonvoting.
C. THE NON-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF CONCENTRATION
The proponents of a more competitive economic order oppose
the concentration of economic power on political and social, as
well as economic, grounds. They argue, essentially, that concen-
tration jeopardizes political liberty and individualism. Professor
Louis B. Schwartz puts this case most eloquently:
The centers of great wealth will own and influence newspapers, maga-
zines and broadcasters, direct the development of universities, retain the
ablest lawyers, economists and public relations specialists, finance po-
litical parties, infiltrate or wear down the executive agencies by which
they are supposed to be regulated, and operate powerful lobbies so
that the popular will itself is shaped to their needs. In addition, in-
dividual dignity and responsibility are magnified in a free economy.
Success will not depend solely on the favor of superiors in a great
pyramid of power, but may be achieved also by striking out on one's
own, winning fortune from the patronage of fellowmen. Freedom on the
economic frontier is today's only substitute for the open Western
lands which in other generations nourished American individualism. 209
Both of Professor Schwartz's arguments seem to rest on dubious
premises. It is doubtful that "striking out on one's own" today
offers greater scope for the development of individuality than
executive responsibility in a large-scale corporation. Too much of
the writing on the modern corporation misses the excitement and
the drama always present in the administration of any large organi-
zation, whether private or public. Nor is it clear that the decline
of American individualism-if, in truth, there has been any-is a
consequence of the disappearance of the small entrepreneur. The
life of the typical small businessman is not particularly conducive
to the development of the individual personality.
209. Schwartz, Dissent [from Final Report of the Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws], 1 ANTITRUsT BULL. 37, 39
(1955). Professor Wallich, too, views competition as "the classical mechan-
ism through which a free economy upholds political liberty." WALLICH,
op. cit. supra note 161, at 58 (1960).
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Schwartz's fear that the "popular will" may be "shaped" to
the "needs" of the "centers of great wealth" must be taken more
seriously. Concentrated power is always a danger, but the institu-
tions of democracy function to hold it in check. The relationship
created is always one of tension, but on the whole it has been
tolerable. This is not to say that economic power may not, on
occasion, be wielded for political purposes. Some reporters, for
example, voiced the suspicion that the United States Steel Corpora-
tion was politically motivated when it held the steel price line
for two years under a Republican Administration, only to increase
prices, in April of 1962, under a Democratic Administration.
Mr. Blough, however, denied that there was any basis for this
suspicion.210 Ascertainment of the truth in this matter may be
left to the historians. Looking ahead, however, it is interesting
to note that Berle sees economic power "gradually but steadily
being aggregated under the American system in nonpolitical but
equally impersonal fiduciary institutions," run by "non-Statist civil
servants."'
It is erroneous to discern too necessary a relationship be-
tween the economic order and the political order. To maintain
that a competitive order, as Professor Schwartz defines it, is neces-
sary for the preservation of political liberty is to accept the
Marxian conception that the economic structure of a society de-
termines its political "superstructure." But this conception has been
refuted by experience.
The economy of the Third Reich was more like ours than like
the Soviet economy, yet the political totalitarianisms of the Nazis
and Communists more closely resembled each other than either
resembled our political democracy. The history of the Soviet Union
itself refutes the view that the political order is merely a function
of the economic order. Indeed, the Bolsheviks created their econ-
omic order to serve their political objectives. 212 Now the Russian
Communists openly acknowledge that there are many "roads to
socialism" and that different economic systems-ranging from Ti-
to's "market" socialism13 to Mao's communes-are consistent with
one-party (Communist Party) rule.
Democracies have also coexisted with a variety of economic
systems. Both the British and American democracies antedated and
survived the Industrial Revolution. And while the "mixed econo-
210. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1962, p. 18, col. 6 (transcript of news con-
ference held by Roger M. Blough on April 12, 1962).
211. BERLE, op. cit. supra note 140, at 51, 76.
212. See 2 CARR, Thn BoLsHviK REvOLUTION, 1917-1923 (1952).
213. See Landy, Reforms in Yugoslavia, Problems of Communism, Nov.-
Dec. 1961, p. 24.
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my" (not the economy of classical competition) is characteristic
of Western democracies today, the ingredients of the mixture differ
considerably from country to country. In few other democracies
is competition as important an ingredient as in ours. What basis,
then, is there for insisting that it is only the competitive features
of our economic order that keep political liberty alive?
Our own history demonstrates that the growth of large-scale
economic organizations has not been accompanied by a decline
in the vitality of our democracy. Quite the contrary. During the
period of this growth, the industrial worker has been admitted
to full-fledged membership in our political community, and racial
and religious minorities have been able to struggle, with increasing
success, for equal rights and opportunities.
There is little evidence that the "centers of great wealth" domi-
nate the political process itself. Indeed, special efforts seem to be
necessary to stimulate the interest of corporate executives in politi-
cal affairs. A recent study points out that the "businessmen in
politics" movement did not begin in earnest until after the "humili-
ating rout" of the Republican Party in the congressional elections
of 1958, which is attributed, in significant measure, to the work
of the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education.214 And
all seem to agree that this movement never took hold; in the course
of the 1962 election campaign, ex-President Eisenhower felt im-
pelled once again to exhort businessmen to get into politics. On
the other hand, a trade unionist may conclude, with reason, that
the "American labor movement has changed the face of American
politics."21
Available evidence, too, does not nourish the fear that democ-
racy is threatened by the power of money that the executives
of large-scale corporations put at the disposal of the party of
their choice. Dean Heard concludes:
Despite a general financial inferiority, it cannot be argued con-
vincingly that the Democratic party has lost a single presidential elec-
tion in the twentieth century for want of funds. If the facts could be
known, the number of candidates at lower political levels whose de-
feat could be ascribed simply to a shortage of funds would probably
be comparatively few.21 6
214. Hacker & Aberbach, Business in Politics, 27 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 266 (1962).
215. Zon, Labor in Politics, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234, 251
(1962).
216. HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY 34-35 (1960). Dean Heard
points out that money is more influential in deciding "who will be a can-
didate for a party's nomination and who will not." Id. at 35.
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The increasing cost of financing electoral campaigns, particularly
primaries, warrants public attention and concern, but this problem
is not a by-product of the concentration of economic power nor
will measures aimed at concentration solve it.
Do the holders of concentrated economic power threaten our
democracy because they control the mass media of information
either directly or by their advertising expenditures? Do they exer-
cise this control to impose their values upon the people and thereby
set definite limits upon the scope of action of the elected repre-
sentatives of the people? There is danger here. Public relations
campaigns, for example, are conducted by segments of the busi-
ness community to disparage public spending for the satisfaction
of communal needs, while extolling private spending to satisfy
not-so-urgent private wants. But it is doubtful that a change in
our hierarchy of values is dependent upon the restoration of a
more competitive economic order or that a more competitive
society will produce less acquisitive individuals.
We may agree, however, that the dispersal of economic power
helps to curb the abuse of power and to diffuse energy into the
economic decision-making process as a whole. The creation of
a more competitive order, however, is neither the only nor the
best way to disperse economic power. We have succeeded in en-
larging the number of effective participants in the process of
making economic decisions by creating centers of countervailing
private and public power. 17
I1. WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT THE
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER?
A. Tim ALTERNATVS
So long as the managers of large-scale corporations in oligop-
olistic industries possess the power to make price decisions, the
public will have reason to inquire about the policies these de-
cisions are designed to implement. Berle is optimistic that the
acceptability of these policies to society will, in time, become the
principal criterion by which the decisions of the managers will
themselves be guided. Corporate managers, he writes, are devel-
oping an appreciation of the "public consensus"--the "set of
ideas, widely held by the community .. . that certain uses of
power are 'wrong,' that is, contrary to the established interest
217. See generally GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: TAE CONCEPT
OF COUNTERVAiLiNG PowER (rev. ed. 1956); Auerbach, Law and Social
Change in the United States, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 516 (1959).
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and value system of the community."21 This development is
encouraging. But it is also apparent that neither "the public con-
sensus" nor the "corporate conscience" is sufficiently developed
as yet to prevent the kind of clash that occurred between the
United States Steel Corporation and the President of the United
States in April of 1962. How can the development of both the
public consensus and the corporate conscience be facilitated?
Those who, like Professor Schwartz, are dissatisfied with posing
the question in this fashion seek to destroy the managerial power
of decision by advocating the breakup of industrial concentra-
tions. Others seek ways of defining, if not imposing, objectives
of public policy for the private power-holders to attain. The dif-
ficulty to date seems to be that those who are dissatisfied with
the status quo regard these alternatives as mutually exclusive,
choose one, and attack the other; an effective job of mutual
demolition is usually accomplished, while the status quo remains.
B. ANTITRUST POLICY
1. The Need for Additional Inquiry
Few of the witnesses who appeared before the Kefauver Sub-
committee were sanguine about the possibility of enacting an
adequate body of law, which the Subcommittee concluded does
not exist, to eliminate "control of the market by a few large enter-
prises which may behave in such a manner as to yield exactly
the same result as would be produced by a complete one-company
monopoly or by outright conspiracy." ' 9 Furthermore, it is dis-
couraging to read a work by a close and discerning student of
our antitrust policy that concludes that a factual and analytic basis
does not yet exist upon which to decide the economic issues raised
by this policy.2 ' There are, as noted above, sharp differences
in the views of competent men even when they look at the same
data. Unfortunately, the Kefauver Subcommittee did not try to
bring before it the men who differed on these economic issues
and to challenge them either to demolish the positions they op-
posed or else reach agreement with their opponents, at least on
the lines fresh inquiry should take to resolve differences. To the
extent that the legislative investigating process was depended upon
to develop a consensus on which legislative and administrative
decisions can be based, it failed in this case.
218. BERLE, op. cit. supra note 140, at 90-91.
219. Steel Industry Report 2.
220. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ISSUES (1962).
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It may be that the necessary fact-finding and analysis can best
be undertaken or sponsored by the antitrust agencies. The De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission will also
be able to use these studies in planning their enforcement activi-
ties. These agencies should examine the structure and market
practices of each of our industries and undertake to say whether
the objectives of the antitrust laws are being attained in each in-
dustry. If they are not being attained in a particular industry, the
study should indicate how that industry's structure and market
behavior can be made to conform with antitrust goals. If the agen-
cies conclude that existing law makes it impossible to do so in
the case of particular industries, they should propose the neces-
sary additional legislation.
2. Proposals to Break Up Existing Concentrations
Professor Schwartz has suggested that a new agency be estab-
lished with powers similar to those held by the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act in order "to compel the reorganization of excessively
large enterprises into units" no larger than may be "justified by
production or distribution economies.' Professors Kaysen and
Turner have similarly proposed the creation of an Industrial Re-
organization Commission to bring suits before an Economic Court
to compel the structural reorganization of firms possessing market
power, and the creation of new independent companies.2 -'
Immediately after the threatened steel price increase was with-
drawn in the spring of 1962, Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee
introduced a bill to amend section 2 of the Sherman Act in order
to give the courts "the same yardstick to apply to break up existing
large concentrations, that they can already apply to prevent pro-
posed mergers and acquisitions."'  The bill would have made it
illegal for any corporation with assets in excess of 100 million
dollars to engage in interstate or foreign commerce if the "effect
of its business activities may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly, in any line of commerce" in any
221. Schwartz, supra note 209, at 69-70.
222. KAYSEN & TuRNER, ANTrrrUST POLIcY 266-72 (1959). The auth-
ors conclusively presume the existence of "market power" if "for five years
or more, one company has accounted for 50 percent or more of annual
sales in the market, or four or fewer companies have accounted for 80
percent of sales." Id. at 267. They would, however, permit such firms to
defend suits to compel their structural reorganization on stated grounds
that justify the existence of market power. Id. at 268.
223. 108 CONG. REc. 6052 (daily ed. April 16, 1962). The bill is S.
3167, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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section of the United States. In any suit brought under the act
to enforce this new prohibition:
[P]roof that such corporation during any of the preceding five years
has conducted its affairs in such a way as to indicate a substantial
lack of competition or any lessening of competition in the production
and marketing of commodities of any class produced within the United
States shall constitute prima facie proof that the effect of the business
activities of that corporation with respect to articles or commodities
of that class may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly, in commerce in articles or commodities of that
class within the United States.
Finally, the bill would have required a court that found that a
corporation had violated the proposed prohibition to "enter its
order requiring the dissolution of such corporation and the re-
arrangement of its assets, liabilities, and share capital in such
manner as may be required to establish two or more unrelated
enterprises the business activities of which will not substantially
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, in commerce in
such class of articles or commodities" in any section of the United
States.
The Gore bill bears the marks of hasty drafting, and it has been
ignored. If the breakup of firms possessing market power is the
objective, the carefully thought out proposal of Professors Kaysen
and Turner is much to be preferred. The Kefauver Subcommittee
would perform a public service if it made a serious effort to enact
such a proposal. Even if the attempt should fail, the current myth
about how our economy functions might be exploded and the
status quo accepted without the guilt feelings, shared by business-
men and intellectuals, that are provoked by the discrepancies be-
tween the myth and reality. Or serious public attention might be
forced upon possible alternatives to our antitrust policy.
C. POLICIES OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
1. The Need for Regulation
The term "regulation" in this context will be used to include
reference to policies of guidance that fall short of direction by
government.
The clash between the President and the steel industry in April,
1962, made it clear that corporate managers will no longer be
permitted to act as the principal arbiters of the conflicting claims
of their stockholders, employees, suppliers, dealers, and customers
and of living and future generations. While this clash disclosed
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the need for regulation, it raised perplexing questions about the
institutional form regulation should take.
The controversies engendered during the course of the hearings
of the Kefauver Subcommittee revealed the lack of agreement on
issues that would have to be resolved if policies of regulation were
to be 'adopted. There seems to be agreement on the desirability
of attaining full employment, a satisfactory rate of economic
growth, and :reasonable price stability, but not on whether these
objectives are consistent with each other nor on what wage and
price policies will best effectuate them. Furthermore, there does
not seem to be any "public consensus" on the standards of justice
or equality that should govern the distribution of the national
income. What is a "fair" wage? Or a "fair" profit?
2. Should the Courts Perform Additional Regulatory Functions?
It has been proposed that we should make additional use of
the courts to control the exercise of concentrated economic power.
Professor Corwin Edwards, for example, recently reported:
"I . . . saw a suggestion, by a person who has substantial in-
fluence on public policy, to the effect that large companies should
be given public utility status. This would mean, of course, that
they would be required to sell to all comers at reasonable
prices."'2 The courts would be relied upon to enforce this dual
obligation. It has also been urged, quite frequently of late, that
the modern corporation, as well as the trade union and any other
private association wielding power, should be regarded as "pri-
vate governments" and subjected to the constitutional restraints
now imposed upon the federal and state governments. -25 If the
Supreme Court of the United States accepted this view, it would
assume the ultimate responsibility to review the exercise of cor-
porate power.
This is not the place to explain the legal doctrines under which
it is thought that private power-wielding associations can be "con-
stitutionalized" or to predict whether the Supreme Court will once
again effect a constitutional revolution by adopting any one of
them. There is always the possibility of constitutional amendment
224. Edwards, Large Enterprises and Antitrust Policy, in NATIONAL IN-
DUSTRIL CONFERENCE BOARD, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD COMPETITION 14
(1962).
225. See, e.g., MILLER, PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1959); Pekelis, Private Governments and the Federal Constitution, in
LAw AND SOCIAL ACTION 91-127 (Konvitz ed. 1950); Berle, Constitutional
Limitations on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from
Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952).
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if the objective is vital enough. But what would be accomplished
by such constitutional interpretation or amendment?
Though one of the first to advance the proposal, Pekelis warned
that "constitutional control of de facto governments of churches
or unions, fraternities or monopolies, trade associations or uni-
versities, is big not only with hopes but with dangers as well-the
danger of a monistic, centralized, coalescent leviathan state."2 '
Whether or not the fusion of economic and political power must
lead, inevitably, to the extinction of individual freedoms, Western
democratic societies have seen sufficient danger in the combination
to oppose it. To hold that the corporation and the trade union
should be-regarded as private governments is to equate economic
power in our society with political power. While it would still be
possible to justify the relative independence of the "economic"
order as a means of decentralizing the "political" order, it would
be difficult for public government to deny its responsibility for
whatever it permitted private government to do. The assumption
of such responsibility would encourage intervention to discharge it,
and the grounds for Pekelis' fears are laid bare.
This objection to the proposed legal concept of private govern-
ment may have theoretical significance only. But examination of
the uses to which the concept would be put even by Pekelis reveals
practical difficulties. Since the constitutional revolution of the
1930's, the Supreme Court has upheld the power of federal and
state legislatures to regulate the activities of the corporation and
the trade union to promote objectives that the legislatures, with
reason, think will promote the public interest. Anything the courts
might do under the "constitutionalization" proposal, therefore, the
legislatures may do. Furthermore, the legislatures may act in a
legal framework that does not make them responsible, even
theoretically, for the activities of private associations that they
do not choose to control. Those who would give the term "private
government" a legal, and not merely metaphorical,227 sense wish
to empower the Supreme Court to review and set aside acts of
"private governments" in the face of the legislatures' neutrality
toward, or even approval of, these acts. But is the Supreme Court
competent to perform this regulatory function, and would its per-
formance be consistent with the proper role of the Court in our
democracy?
No general answer can be given to the question of competence;
226. Pekelis, supra note 225, at 126.
227. Even as a metaphor, the term "private government" is misleading
if it results in stressing the similarities between public and private govern-
ments to the neglect of their differences.
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the Court's competence will vary with the particular corporate
decision sought to be subjected to judicial review. Pekelis, for
example, would impose upon private associations a judicially-en-
forceable "duty to act fairly, and with decent respect for the in-
dividual rights of those who, as suppliers, investors, workers, or
buyers, are subject to their powers." -m Undoubtedly, the courts
are competent to ensure that corporations and trade unions, as
well as governments, follow employment practices that do not
discriminate against individuals on racial or religious grounds.
Yet even in this field we have a sizable body of legislation, often
implemented by administrative agencies, aimed at eradicating dis-
criminatory employment practices. Because many legislatures,
including Congress, have not yet passed such laws, should the
Supreme Court of the United States make itself the supreme fair
employment practices agency in the country? The federal courts-
which must enforce public school desegregation, the voting rights
of the Negro and, now, fair legislative apportionment-bear heavy
responsibilities. By giving them tasks that other branches of govern-
ment should perform, we may jeopardize the functions that only
they can perform. Certainly this risk should be run only to secure
the fundamental rights of the individual. While there may be a
reasonable difference of opinion about what rights are "funda-
mental," the "constitutionalization" of private power-wielding as-
sociations would not permit this distinction.
Yet it would not be wise to ask the Supreme Court to decide,
as a constitutional matter, whether a junior executive of a large
corporation has been deprived of a promotion for some arbitrary
reason other than his race or religion, or to ask the Court to formu-
late the constitutional rights of suppliers, dealers, and customers.
Refusals to deal, for example, now present the courts with dif-
ficult questions, even though the criteria of legality are tied to
the maintenance-of-competition objective of the antitrust laws.
What is "fair dealing" vis-6-vis the supplier, dealer, or buyer,
apart from this objective? Agencies regulating public utilities have
found it difficult to administer legislative prohibitions against dis-
criminatory dealings. How should the courts define discrimination
without any legislative guidance at all?
Furthermore, it would be most unwise to ask the Supreme Court
to determine a "fair" wage and a "fair" price under the guise of
interpreting the Constitution. Should it take a constitutional amend-
ment to alter the judicial pattern of price and wage regulation?
To ask the Court to undertake these regulatory activities, in short,
228. Pekelis, supra note 225, at 118-19.
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would not only tax its competence, but would also impair the
function of the legislature in our democracy. If regulation is de-
sirable, it should be adopted as public policy by the legislature,
which should spell out the regulatory standards with sufficient
specificity to disclose the ends of policy.
Finally, implementation of the legislative policy should be en-
trusted to an administrative agency. It should not be forgotten
that the impracticability of public utility regulation under the com-
mon law and through the medium of judicial enforcement of
regulatory provisions in utility charters led to the creation
of administrative agencies to do the job. To return regulation to
the courts is not a sensible way to avoid the limitations of the
administrative process. It is true that policy-making under the
antitrust laws has been delegated, in significant measure, to the
courts. But this experiment has hardly proved to be an unqualified
success. It is interesting that Professors Schwartz, Kaysen, and
Turner agree upon the need to set up a new administrative agency
to implement their proposals for change in the antitrust laws.
3. Regulation Under the Employment Act of 1946
By this act,229 Congress created a means of guiding, but not
directing, the exercise of private economic power. The act re-
quires the President in his Economic Report to the Congress (1)
to specify the levels of employment, production, and purchasing
power, needed to maintain full employment, a satisfactory rate
of economic growth, and reasonable price stability; (2) to estimate
whether current and foreseeable trends will lead to the effectuation
of these goals; and if not (3) to suggest policies that will. The
act thus looks to the President (and his Council of Economic
Advisers) to make these determinations in a way that can guide
private decision-making.23 ° Congress retains the ultimate responsi-
bility for carrying out the objectives of the act.
The 1962 Economic Report of the President attempted to dis-
charge the obligation to guide the decisions of corporation and
trade union executives to a greater extent than any of the previous
reports. In this report, the Council of Economic Advisers first
enunciated what Secretary of Defense McNamara came to describe
in April of 1962 as "the President's program to maintain price
stability based on a national wage policy which limits wage in-
creases to productivity gains."23' The Council itself, more mod-
229. 60 Stat. 23 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1958).
230. For suggestions as to how far this guidance function should be
carried, see Colim, Economic Stabilization Policy, in ECONOMICS AND THE
POLICY MAKER (1959).
231. N.Y. Times, April 14, 1962, p. 10, col. 2.
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estly, purported to offer "guideposts for noninflationary wage
and price behavior" by firms and unions that "exercise consider-
able discretion over the terms of wage bargains and price deci-
sions. 'z 2 Thus the Council suggested that "the rate of increase in
wage rates (including fringe benefits) in each industry be equal
to the trend rate of over-all productivity increase"; if a particular
industry's rate of productivity increase exceeds the over-all rate,
it should reduce its prices; if it lags behind the over-all rate, a
price increase is appropriate.' The Council stressed that it was
offering a general guide, not a rule, because it was assuming no
change in the relative shares of labor and nonlabor incomes in
a particular industry, even though "there is nothing immutable
in fact or in justice about the distribution of the total product
between labor and nonlabor incomes." 4
Exceptions to the "general guide" were also recognized by the
Council. Wage increases not warranted by productivity gains were
regarded as legitimate if necessary to attract sufficient labor to
an industry or to raise "exceptionally low" wages. On the other
hand, wage increases might fall short of those warranted by
productivity gains if necessary to provide jobs for the entire labor
force in a particular industry or if wages were "exceptionally high."
Similarly, price movements might not follow the general guide in
industries in which (1) profits were either insufficient to attract
needed capital or an outflow of capital was desirable; (2) costs
other than labor costs have risen or fallen; or (3) "excessive market
power has resulted in rates of profit substantially higher than those
earned elsewhere on investments of comparable risk."'
The program of the President as described by the Council of
Economic Advisers is much more flexible and difficult of ap-
plication to particular cases than the policy that Secretary Mc-
Namara accused United States Steel of attempting to undermine
in April, 1962.
4. The President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management
Policy
Early in his Administration, President Kennedy attempted to
create an institutional framework within which labor and manage-
ment could participate in the formulation of wage-price policies
to further the public interest. These policies would then be the
measure of the public responsibilities that the President was re-
232. CouNcm oP ECONOMIc ADvis- s ANN. REP. 185 (1962).
233. Id. at 189.
234. Id. at 185, 189.
235. Id. at 189.
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questing corporations and trade unions to discharge. An Advisory
Committee on Labor-Management Policy was established, com-
posed of the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Commerce, and
seven members from labor, seven from management, and five from
the public, designated by the President. 36 The Committee was
given the task of studying and recommending to the President
"policies that may be followed by labor, management, or the public
which will promote free and responsible collective bargaining,
industrial peace, sound wage and price policies, higher standards
of living, and increased productivity" and "ensure that American
products are competitive in world markets. 237 It was also asked
to consider "the benefits and problems created by automation and
other technological advances. 238
To date, the Committee has issued only two reports-one deals
with automation2 39 and the other with collective bargaining.
240
The problem of "sound wage and price policies" is on its current
agenda. The Report on Collective Bargaining calls for "preserving
the free and voluntary nature of decision-making which collective
bargaining represents," but admonishes labor and management
that "the privilege they enjoy to agree or disagree on terms and
236. Exec. Order No. 10918, 26 Fed. Reg. 1427 (1961).
The labor representatives initially designated were David Dubinsky, Presi-
dent, International Ladies' Garment Workers Union; George M. Harrison,
President, Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks; Joseph D. Keenan,
Secretary, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Thomas Ken-
nedy, President, United Mine Workers of America; David J. McDonald,
President, United Steelworkers of America; George Meany, President, Amer-
ican Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations; and
Walter P. Reuther, President, United Automobile Workers of America.
The management representatives were Elliott V. Bell, Chairman of the
Executive Committee, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.; Joseph L. Block,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Inland Steel Co.; Henry Ford It,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Ford Motor Co.; John M. Franklin,
Chairman of the Board of Directors, United States Lines Co.; J. Spencer
Love, Chairman and President, Burlington Industries, Inc.; Richard S, Reyn-
olds, Jr., President, Reynolds Metal Co.; and Thomas J. Watson, Jr., Presi-
dent, International Business Machines Corp.
The public representatives were Dr. Arthur F. Burns, President, National
Bureau of Economic Research; David L. Cole, attorney and arbitrator;
Dr. Clark Kerr, President, University of California; Dr. George W. Taylor,
Professor of Labor Relations, Wharton School of Finance, University of
Pennsylvania; and Ralph E. McGill, Publisher, The Atlanta Constitution.
237. Exec. Order No. 10918, § 2, 26 Fed. Reg. 1427 (1961).
238. Ibid.
239. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POL-
ICY, REPORT ON THE BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO AUTOMATION
AND OTHER TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES (1962).
240. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POL-
ICY, REPORT ON FREE AND RESPONSIBLE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND IN-
DUSTRIAL PEACE (1962).
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conditions of employment can be preserved only if it is exercised
responsibly."'2 To encourage responsibility, the Report states
that the Committee proposed, and the President approved, the
convening of periodic conferences of labor, management, and
public officials under government auspices to "apprise the parties
of relevant governmental objectives and policies and also provide
an opportunity for industry and labor spokesmen to offer con-
structive recommendations to the Government. '242 These con-
ferences, the Report emphasized, "will obviously not provide form-
ulas for the disposition of matters at issue between parties engaged
in negotiations." Nor, the Report continued, "do we believe that
such formulas would be desirable or in the interest of preserving
free collective bargaining. 243
It is difficult to know what to make of this report in the context
of the April, 1962, encounter between the President and the steel
industry. The Report, which was made public in May of 1962,
does not mention this controversy; nor does it mention the formu-
lae for a wage-price policy suggested by the Council of Economic
Advisers. However, an addendum to the Report indicates that the
Committee plans to study further "the relationship of concentra-
tion of labor and management power to the development of na-
tional emergency situations.2 44
5. The National Consumer Advisory Council
To give the consumer a voice "on issues of broad economic
policy," and "on governmental programs protecting consumer
needs," the President, on July 18, 1962, named the 12 members
of a national Consumer Advisory Council..2 45 The Council is to
241. Id. at 2.
242. Id. at 3. As of this writing, one such conference-the White House
Conference on Economic Issues-has been held.
243. Ibid.
244. Id. at 6, 7. The words of Arthur F. Burns are quoted.
245. H.R. Doc. No. 364, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3813 (1962) (message
of the President to Congress, offering various measures for the protection
of consumer interests). The members of the Council are: Helen Canoyer,
Dean, Home Economics School, Cornell University (chairman); David
Angevine, Information Director, Cooperative League of the U.S.A.; Persia
Campbell, Chairman, Economics Department, Queens College; Stephen Dub-
rul, Partner in Lehman Brothers and a Director of May Department Stores;
Mrs. John Lee, past President, League of Women Voters; Edward Lewis,
Executive Director, Urban League of Greater New York; Walter Mondale,
Attorney General, Minnesota; Richard Morse, Chairman, Family Econ-
omics Department, Kansas State University; Helen Nelson, Consumer Coun-
sel, California; Sylvia Porter, newspaper columnist; Caroline Ware, Chair-
man of President Truman's Consumer Advisory Committee; and Colston
Warne, President, Consumers Union.
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make recommendations to the Council of Economic Advisers.
While it has been meeting bimonthly, the Consumer Council
has not yet made public any recommendations or reports.
6. Presidential Intervention
Early in his Administration, President Kennedy indicated his
readiness to intervene personally on behalf of wage and price
policies that he thought would further the public interest. Under
the contracts between the steel industry and the steel workers,
a wage increase was scheduled to take effect on October 1, 1961.
On September 6, 1961, the President wrote to the heads of the
12 largest steel companies urging them to hold the price line after
the wage increases became effective. The President stated:
If the industry were now to forego a price increase, it would enter
collective bargaining negotiations next Spring with a record of 3 /
years of price stability. . . It would clearly then be the turn of the
labor representatives to limit wage demands to a level consistent with
continued price stability. The moral position of the steel industry next
Spring-and its claim to the support of public opinion-will be
strengthened by the exercise of price restraint now.2 6
Although Mr. Roger Blough of United States Steel disputed
the facts on which the President based his argument that the
steel industry could afford to absorb the coming wage increase,
the industry exercised the restraint called for by the President.
Early in 1962, therefore, the Administration, through Secretary
of Labor Goldberg, was instrumental in getting labor and manage-
ment in the steel industry to negotiate and conclude a new agree-
ment well in advance of the time when the old agreement was
to expire. 47 Secretary Goldberg also, it was reported, helped
to persuade the steelworkers to keep their demands within the
expected three percent annual productivity increase. Under this
formula, an increase of 12 cents an hour during the first year
of the new contract would have been warranted; the increase
agreed upon was estimated at ten cents an hour.248 This is why,
as noted above, the President hailed the settlement as nonin-
flationary.
In February of 1962, addressing the Executives' Club in Chi-
246. The President's letter and the reply of Mr. Roger Blough, Chair-
man of the Board of United States Steel, have been reprinted in a pamphlet
of the Public Relations Department of United States Steel.
247. Address by Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg Before the
Officers and Directors of the Executives' Club, Chicago, Illinois, U.S. De-
partment of Labor News Release, Feb. 23, 1962.
248. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1962, § 4, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
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cago, Secretary Goldberg stated flatly that the Administration was
prepared, unhesitatingly, to discharge its obligation "to define the
national interest and assert it when it reaches important proportions
in any area of our economy. '249 However, the Secretary was
not prepared to be specific. "But we are only going to do that
[assert and define the national interest]," he stated, "to make sure
that the government defines what the government can do, that the
government does not do what the government cannot do, and that
is enter into the collective bargaining situation as a party who
is involved in what the real parties themselves ought to do." The
Government, the Secretary reiterated, "ought to act like the
government and not replace the parties or their responsibility in
collective bargaining."2 '
In less than two months, the President's public denunciation
of United States Steel's abortive price increase made it somewhat
clearer how the Administration proposed to discharge its obligation
to guard the public interest. But confusion has not been entirely
dissipated. The President's action would seem to imply that the
theory of intervention expounded by the Secretary of Labor was
not going to be heeded in practice. But Solicitor General Archi-
bald Cox, for example, rejects the interpretation that the President
intervened to veto the decision of the steel executives. Instead,
he views the Presidential intervention as reflecting governmental
insistence upon "an opportunity to be heard as spokesman of the
wider public interest [which he identifies primarily with the suc-
cessful meeting of foreign competition and solution of the in-
ternational balance of payments problem] while the decision is
being made."" 1 This is a surprising commentary on a tough and
effective exercise of a Presidential veto.2
249. Goldberg, supra note 247. The Secretary also advocated that the
Government should provide the parties with the statistical and economic
analyses necessary for intelligent bargaining.
250. Ibid.
251. Cox, Wages, Prices, Government and Lawyers, Harv. Law School
Bull., June 1962, p. 5.
252. By contrast, in 1958 Senator Kefauver repeatedly urged President
Eisenhower to intervene to prevent the steel price increase that materialized
in August of that year. 1958 Hearings, pt. 8, at 4457-58. President Eisen-
hower refused. Id. at 4460, 4478-79. Secretary of Labor Mitchell explained
that this refusal was prompted by "deep respect for our system of free en-
terprise" and reluctance "to take steps that could amount to intervention
in an area of private labor and management responsibilities." Id. at 4480.
Senator Kefauver urged the President to take the following steps: (1) con-
vene informal conferences between the leaders of the steel industry and
government representatives; (2) publicly request the industry to abstain from
making the increase; (3) issue suggested price ceilings and ask the industry
to adhere to them voluntarily; (4) persuade labor to avoid inflationary
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The President's personal intervention to forestall the steel price
increase in April of 1962 raises many perplexing questions. The
subsidiary effect of this action was to transmute certain "guide-
posts" for private behavior into a "national wage policy" limiting
wage increases to productivity gains. This policy is subject to the
serious criticism, which the Council of Economic Advisers ad-
vanced, that it assumes the existing distribution of the national
income to be equitable. Moreover, it is debatable whether wage
increases that result, immediately, in cost increases per unit of
output may not perform a socially useful function in spurring
technological progress. This spur may be lost if wage increases
are always to be bounded by average productivity gains.
Secondly, the steel industry action was thwarted without giving
the industry an opportunity to justify it, even by the guideposts
erected by the Council of Economic Advisers. In fact, of course,
there were no standards authoritatively laid down by which the
steel executives had to be guided. The President acted, apparently,
because the steel industry violated what he understood to be an
implicit agreement not to raise its prices if a noninflationary wage
settlement was obtained.25 3 But the most important question is
raised by the intervention itself and not by the policy for which the
President interceded. It is not wise to make the enforcement of
any wage-price policy depend upon a test of strength between
the President of the United States and the executives of a great
industry or a great labor union. If such a test comes, the President
must not lose,ssa but it is frightening to watch the President muster
wage demands; and (5) issue brief summary analyses of the industry's prices,
profits and production, indicating generally whether a price increase was
required and if so, how much. Id. at 4458.
253. See Cox, supra note 251, at 5. In his year-end discussion with the
reporters representing the NBC, CBS and ABC networks, the President,
in retrospect, gave the following reason for his intervention:
It seemed to me that the question of good faith was involved and that
if ... after asking the unions to accept the non-inflationary settlement,
.. I had not attempted to use my influence to have the companies hold
their prices stable, . . . the union could have rightfully felt that they
had been misled. In my opinion, [this] . . . would have made it im-
possible for us to exert any influence from the public point of view
in labor-management disputes which affect the public interest. So I
have no regrets. The fact is, we were successful ....
Washington Post, Dec. 18, 1962, p. A12, col. 5.
253a.
Now, supposing we had tried and made a speech about it and then
failed. I would have thought that would have been an awful setback
to the office of the presidency . . . . There is no sense in raising hell
and then not being successful. There is no sense in putting the office
of the presidency on the line on an issue and then being defeated.
Time, Dec. 28, 1962, p. 15.
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the immense powers of the federal government against even so
formidable an antagonist as United States Steel in order to assure
his victory.
Furthermore, it is not desirable that the President should act
alone in these matters. The issues, it is respectfully submitted,
are not merely "sophisticated and technical," as the President seems
to think."4 Nor will "sophisticated solutions" necessarily promote
the public interest when the issue is how the national income should
be divided. This question is also political, and the public interest
requires that it be solved by a tolerable accommodation of con-
flicting claims. If, therefore, there is to be governmental interven-
tion in the process of determining wages and prices, it should be
sanctioned by the Congress, which is the most suitable instrument
of accommodation in our democracy.
This is easier said than done. The knotty problem is the form
that legislative intervention should take. It does not help much
to be told that there "would seem to be a wide range of possibilities
between non-intervention, on the one extreme, and, on the other
public regulation through orders backed by force of law."' -
When the range of effective possibilities is canvassed, it must be
acknowledged that there is no satisfactory resolution of our prob-
lem.
7. Additional Legislative Intervention
(a) S. 215, 86th Congress, 1st Session (1959)
Solicitor General Cox has called for "some new procedural ar-
rangement" to enable the government to define and assert the
public interest at a fairly early stage in the process of wage and
price decision-making and to "understand and take into account
the pressing interests of the parties most immediately affected.""mG
These were the objectives of the procedural arrangement proposed
by S. 215, which was sponsored by Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney
of Wyoming, then a member of the Kefauver Subcommittee."T This
254. President Kennedy's Commencement Address at Yale University,
Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1962, p. 20, cols. 1, 3. The President said:
The central domestic problems of our own time . . . relate . . . to
research . . . for sophisticated solutions to complex and obstinate
issues ....
What we need is, not more labels and more cliches, but more basic
discussion of the sophisticated and technical questions involved in
keeping our mighty economic machine moving steadily ahead.
255. Cox, supra note 251, at 6.
256. Ibid.
257. For the text of this bill, see 1959 Hearings, pt. 11, at 5183-85.
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bill forbade any large corporation in a concentrated industry2r
from increasing the prices of its products until 30 days after it
delivered a notice of the proposed increase to the Federal Trade
Commission, the Attorney General, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and the President of the Senate. Within the 30
day period, the FTC was to call a public hearing, at which, to-
gether with the Attorney General, it was to "examine" the cor-
poration "with respect to the reasons for and justifiability of the
proposed increase and to take testimony on the impact of such
increase upon competition and the economy of the Nation." Their
findings, together with any recommendations they chose to make,
were to be submitted to the Congress and, of course, made public.
While S. 215 sought to ensure some governmental scrutiny of
impending price decisions and would have provided an institu-
tional framework for fact-finding and the application of public
pressure, it was deficient in crucial respects. It ignored the prob-
lem of wage policy and imposed a measure of price regulation
without in any way specifying the principles or standards by which
a proposed price increase would be evaluated.
(b) S. 3168 and S. 3169, 87th Congress, 2d Session (1962)
The steel controversy in April of 1962 revived the idea em-
bodied in S. 215. On April 16, 1962, Senator Gore accompanied
his bill to break up corporations controlling assets of more than
100 million dollars with two other bills aimed at less drastic, but
significant, objectives. S. 3168 proposed to apply the national-
emergency-strike-delaying provisions of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947259 to price increases that threaten to "im-
peril the national health or safety or the economic stability of
the Nation."26 Senator Gore expressed the hope that during the
258. The bill covered every corporation with a capitalization in excess of
$10,000,000 that is engaged in any line of commerce in which eight or
less corporations account for 50 percent or more of the total annual sales
in that line of commerce in the United States. Compare the Kaysen-Turner
definition of the existence of market power, note 222 supra.
259. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
260. The bill empowered the President to appoint a board of inquiry to
investigate the issues involved in any "threatened or actual increase in the
price of any product or service affecting an entire industry or substantial
part thereof" that, if permitted to occur or to continue, would, in the
President's opinion, "imperil the national health or safety, or the economic
stability of the Nation." This board would have reported to the President
on "the facts with respect to the increase," but would not have made any
recommendations. The President could then "direct the Attorney General
to petition the district court ...to enjoin the taking effect or continuation
of" the increase. An injunction would issue if the court found that the
threatened or actual price increase affected an entire industry or a sub-
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80 day period of delay, "the force of public opinion can be brought
into -play, so. as to prevent actions of administered-price industries
inimical to the public welfare. '21  This bill would have created
an even more cumbersome procedure for fact-finding than S. 215
without remedying the latter's deficiencies. It, too, failed to pro-
vide the fact-finding agencies and the public with any principles
or standards by which to judge whether particular actions of ad-
ministered price industries were inimical to the public welfare.
The third bill, S. 3169, proposed to establish a National Con-
sumers Advisory Board, and eight regional boards, to hold hear-
ings, collect information, and publish reports, to provide a sound
basis for informed public opinion with respect to general adjust-
ments of prices or wages (or labor disputes involving such adjust-
ments) that occurred or threatened to occur. It should be noted
that the newly-created national Consumer Advisory Council has
not been given this function. While the bill declares that it is the
federal government's policy "to insure that consumers are charged
fair and equitable prices for goods and services" and relies upon
the proposed consumer boards to mobilize the weight of public
opinion "on actions of management and labor which threaten to
promote price or wage inequities," it does not define "fair and
equitable prices" or "price or wage inequities."
(c) Means' Proposed Economic Performance Act
To his credit, Gardiner Means, in his recent book, has not
evaded the problems of defining the standard of a "just" price
and enforcing it.262 Means urges Congress to adopt an Economic
Performance Act that would apply to "collective enterprises." A
stantial part thereof that, "if permitted to occur or to continue, would im-
peril the national health or safety, or the economic stability, of the Nation."
The issuance of an injunction would also have required the persons who
authorized or proposed the increase to reconsider their decision, in the
light of the report of the statutory board of inquiry and of any report or
recommendations made by any other Government agency at the request of
the President. At the end of a sixty-day period, if the increase had not been
rescinded or the proposed increase withdrawn, the statutory board of in-
quiry wculd. report to the President "the current position of those authoriz-
ing or proposing the increase" and the recommendations with respect to the
increase made by any Government agency or other interested nongovern-
menta' group. The court injunction would be discharged 20 days after the
board of inquiry made this report to the President or as soon as the in-
crease was rescinded or the proposal for an increase withdrawn. After the
injunction was withdrawn, the President was to submit a report of the pro-
ceedings to Congress, "together with such recommendations as he may see
fit to make for consideration and appropriate action."
261. 108 CONG. REC. 6052 (daily ed. April 16, 1962).
262. The account that follows is based upon MEANs, op. cit. supra note
202, at 296-321.
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"collective enterprise," to Means, is any corporation possessing
unregulated pricing power of sufficient magnitude to affect the
corporation with a substantial public interest. He presumes that a
corporation that controls assets of 500 million dollars or more is
in this category, but not a corporation that controls assets of less
than 100 to 200 million dollars. Means concludes that there are
about 100 such collective enterprises, that they account for half
the manufacturing output of the United States, and that ownership
is separated from control of these 100 corporations to a significant
degree.
Means argues that a collective enterprise should be run in the
interest of the management that controls it, but that steps should
be taken to assure that management's interest coincides with the
public interest. He then outlines these steps and, in doing so, indi-
cates why he thinks such a coincidence is possible, even though
the interest of the stockholder, in his opinion, cannot be made
compatible with the public interest.
As noted above, Means' basic objection to administered prices
is that they yield profits in excess of the competitive cost of capital.
Essentially, then, he proposes that the management of a collective
enterprise (which, by his definition, possesses the power to ad-
minister prices) should be induced, by self-interest, to fix prices
that will yield a target rate of return approximating the competi-
tive cost of capital. To this end, Means suggests that bonuses
should be paid to management if it fixes prices on this basis and
if it also improves the economic performance of the collective
enterprise-that is, if it reduces costs, improves technology, expands
the enterprise, and so forth. The Economic Performance Act would
define the tests of improved economic performance broadly, but
the details of the bonus system would be devised by directors who
are not also managers and subjected to the approval of the stock-
holders. The act would then give these management bonuses
favorable tax treatment-Means suggests a 25 percent tax rate.
The Treasury Department, however, would be empowered to re-
ject as "too high" a collective enterprise's estimate of the cost of
capital that its target rate of return must approximate if the man-
agement bonuses are to receive favorable tax treatment. To induce
stockholders to accept the proposed bonus system, Means would
make it an alternative to (1) the breaking up of the collective
enterprise into smaller units; (2) price regulation; or (3) an
excess profits tax.
Means' proposal assumes that the "economic performance" of
management can be judged on some basis other than the quantity
of profits earned by the enterprise. Thus, he takes his stand with
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Professor R. H. Tawney who hoped that the appeal to the profes-
sional feeling of the manager of industry would help to abolish
what Tawney regarded as the tyranny of functionless property.
He wrote:
The difference between industry as it exists today and a profession,
is ... simple and unmistakable. . . The essence of the former is
that its only criterion is the financial return which it offers to its share-
holders. The essence of the latter is that, though men enter it for the
sake of livelihood, the measure of their success is the service which
they perform, not the gains which they amass.
26
Means is not as idealistic as Tawney; he would permit the managers
to amass substantial gains for themselves as a reward for serving
the public.
On the other hand, Professor Michael Polanyi contends that
"economic activities cannot be guided by professional standards
because there exists no system of thought from which such stand-
ards could be derived in respect to this field"; only profit "must
be their guide."'264 Means disagrees. He is persuaded that the
"working out of measures of specific performance for top manage-
ment seems well within the economic, accounting, and engineering
skills already available, '"2 65 and that his proposal would give
management strong incentives to improve these measures.
(d) Lerer's Price Regulation Proposals
Professor A. P. Lerner has suggested a system of price regula-
tion to force administered prices and wages to behave as if they
were not administered. Accordingly, he elaborates the following
standards for such regulation:
(1) administered prices should be permitted to increase only
when production and sales are at capacity;
(2) administered prices should be forced down when pro-
duction and sales are significantly below capacity, but not to a
level that fails to more than cover current operating costs;
(3) administered wages in general should be permitted to in-
crease at a rate equal to the average trend of increase in national
productivity;
(4) administered wages should be permitted to increase at a
greater rate where the labor market is tight; and
263. TAWNEY, THE AcQusrlvwE SociETY 94 (1920).
264. PoLANyi, Tru LoGic oF LiBERTv 166-67 (1951).
265. MEANs, op. cit. supra note 202, at 291. He points out that such
measures have already been worked out for lower-level management.
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(5) administered wages should be permitted to increase at
a smaller rate where the labor market is slack.266
Lerner's price standards assume that the public will be served
if prices in oligopolistic industries are always responsive to short-
run changes in demand-an assumption that is rejected by some
economists, including Means. Furthermore, his standards would
authorize prices to move up when costs moved down and force
prices to move down when costs moved up, thereby setting a
rather difficult task for the regulatory agency.
CONCLUSION
While the Council of Economic Advisers has been concerned
primarily with developing a wage policy that would ensure the
stability of the existing level of administered prices, Means' pro-
posal neglects wage policy entirely and concentrates upon develop-
ing a profit policy that would bring down the existing level
of administered prices. Lerner, however, advocates a wage-price
policy that does not seek to control profits or to ensure the stabil-
ity of the existing level of administered prices. Only the adoption
of Means' suggestion to limit profits, however, may make it pos-
sible to win labor's acceptance of a policy to limit wage increases
to those warranted by average economy-wide gains in productivity.
Each of the possible policy alternatives has serious short-
comings. The Administration might renounce the activist role it
has assumed and rely upon its monetary and fiscal powers to
overcome the adverse effects of the unregulated, private determi-
nation of wages and prices. But this course may make it more
difficult for the countervailing monetary and fiscal policies to
succeed without jeopardizing other objectives of public policy, such
as full employment.
The Administration's present policy of erecting guideposts for
voluntary wage and price behavior and using the powers of the
Chief Executive to assure that there are no flagrant detours is not
a desirable alternative. It creates the danger that the outcome of
an ensuing power clash will be arbitrary, and it fails to commit
Congress to the policies the President is trying to enforce.
Congress, of course, might participate in the elaboration and
effectuation of wage and price policies. But is this a realistic al-
ternative? In a stimulating article, Professor Lindblom points out:
In the United States . . . no part of government attempts a com-
266. Lerner, Inflationary Depression and the Regulation of Administered
Prices, in JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRICES TO
ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1958).
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prehensive overview of policy on income distribution. A policy never-
theless evolves, and one responding to a wide variety of interests. A
process of mutual adjustment among farm groups, labor unions, mu-
nicipalities and school boards, tax authorities, and government agencies
with responsibilities in the fields of housing, health, highways, national
parks, fire, and police accomplishes a distribution of income in which
particular income problems neglected at one point in the decision
processes become central at another point.267
Is it even desirable, then, to look to Congress for a "comprehensive
overview of policy"?
Yet the fact remains that only Congress can register the existing
consensus on the issues in question. If the "muddling through"
process so well described by Professor Lindblom were entirely
satisfactory, the April, 1962, events would not have occurred.
At the least, Congress must continue to focus public attention
and discussion on the policy alternatives. The Kefauver Subcom-
mittee has played a valiant role in discharging this responsibility,
but it cannot be said that its work has been near the center of
Congress' concern.
Attainment of the objectives articulated by the President at
Yale University-"high employment, steady expansion of output,
stable prices and a strong dollar' ' 2 -- will require some form
of statutory price and wage regulation in concentrated industries.
Only this alternative will lead to the establishment of accepted
standards by which to judge wage and price behavior. Statutory
regulation need not entirely exclude private participation in the
determination of wages and prices. Private interests will, of course,
have full opportunity to be heard in the elaboration of the general
standards to be enacted into law. Furthermore, provision could
be made for the implementation of these statutory standards in
each concentrated industry by a tripartite committee representing
labor, management, and the public.269 But the agency responsible
for administering the statute must have the authority to review
the implementing agreement reached in each industry or to make
the initial decision if agreement is not reached. An important pre-
rogative now possessed by the top private administrators of in-
dustrial and labor organizations would thereby be shared with
public officials.
267. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through", 19 PuB. ADMIN.
REv. 79, 85 (1959). See also Lindblom, Policy Analysis, 48 AM. ECON.
REv. 298 (1958).
268. See note 254 supra.
269. See GA.BRAITH, THE LIBERAL HourR 72-74 (1960). Like the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers, Galbraith is primarily concerned with maintain-
ing the stability of the existing level of administered prices.
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It is certain that the imposition of price and wage restraints
in peacetime will be strongly opposed. The Council of Economic
Advisers, for example, rejects this alternative as "unaccept-
able."27 One would be foolish to argue that the Council is not
accurately reflecting congressional sentiment.
One cannot read the voluminous record of the Kefauver Sub-
committee without becoming weary of the same old diagnoses of
our ills and the same stale remedies prescribed for their cure.
Under these circumstances, one can only hope that, as we "muddle-
through," the nature of the problem itself will change to a more
manageable form. There is reason to sustain this hope. Concern
about the concentration of economic power may mirror past
concerns, not future urgencies. Professor Herbert A. Simon, for
example, tells us that we will acquire "the technical capacity to
automate production as fully as we wish, or as we find economi-
cal" and that we will then have "the means to rule out scarcity
as mankind's first problem and to attend to other problems that
are more serious."27' Professor Simon envisages that by 1985
work and production will cease to be basic goals of human en-
deavor.172 As a consequence, the role of the corporation in our
society will no longer be central, and success "in management will
carry smaller rewards in prestige and status. 2 73 Price admini-
stration will become the function of the machine.
270. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 182 (1962).
271. Simon, The Corporation: Will It Be Managed by Machines?, in
MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATIONS 1985, at 52-53 (Anshen & Bach ed.
1961).
272. Id. at 54.
273. Id. at 55.
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